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I.

INTRODUCTION

The phrase “consumer protection case” may conjure up a
used-car buyer trying to get recompense for a vehicle that turned
out to be less than promised, or an elderly homeowner victimized
by predatory lending tactics trying to maintain possession of her
home. In August 2000, the private right of action to enforce
Minnesota consumer protection laws was held to be something
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entirely different. After the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision
1
in Ly v. Nystrom, a business complaining about a competitor’s
advertising is more likely to have available a private right of action
to enforce these laws than either the frustrated car buyer or the
predatory lending victim.
I have been asked to evaluate whether private enforcement of
consumer protection laws in Minnesota is “progressive.” The
answer is that Minnesota courts have essentially shut the
courthouse door on individual consumers seeking redress in
private actions under statutory fraud laws following the judicial
creation in Ly of a “public benefit” limitation on bringing such
lawsuits, and this outcome is not progressive consumer protection
enforcement. Minnesota courts generally permit statutory fraud
suits only in class action cases, for large groups of plaintiffs, and
even for some business plaintiffs.
Part II of this article identifies the meaning of the terms
“consumer protection law” and “progressive,” as used in this
2
article. Part III explains the creation of the “public benefit” limit
3
on suits under Minnesota statutory fraud laws as enunciated in Ly.
Part IV examines the application of this new limiting principle,
concluding that it has all but foreclosed individual consumers from
4
private enforcement of statutory fraud laws. Part V analyzes how
5
Part VI
the public benefit limit overturned prior case law.
discusses the interpretative gaps in the judicial decision creating
the public benefit limit that make it difficult to determine if this
sweeping restriction was the intended result, and that may make
6
the doctrine difficult to sustain. Finally, Part VII concludes that
this restriction of the individual private right of action has impaired
progressive enforcement of consumer protection laws and should
7
be abandoned, or at least substantially narrowed.

1. 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000). The author filed an amicus curiae brief in
this case on behalf of Attorney General Mike Hatch.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part V.
6. See infra Part VI.
7. See infra Part VII.
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II. PROGRESSIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS
Consumer protection laws are a statutory response to the
inadequacy of the common law in protecting buyers from unfair
and deceptive acts in the marketplace. These laws attempt to
regulate a vast array of marketplace conduct using a variety of
legislative strategies. The first subsection below describes the types
of consumer protection laws at both the state and federal level,
distinguishing general statutory fraud laws from topical consumer
protection laws. The following subsection defines “progressive” for
purposes of this article.
A. The Expansive Universe of State Consumer Protection Law
State consumer protection law can be placed in two broad
categories: (1) general statutory fraud laws; and (2) topical laws
that regulate specific types of consumer transactions.
1.

General Statutory Fraud Laws

The primary federal statute broadly protecting consumers
from fraud in the marketplace is section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which declares unlawful “unfair or
8
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” In the 1960s
and 1970s, every state in the country adopted a similar general
statutory fraud law prohibiting unfair and deceptive marketplace
conduct. There are four archetypes of such laws: (1) consumerfraud acts; (2) the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(“UDTPA”); (3) “little FTC” acts, which are substantially similar to
section 5 of the FTC Act; and (4) the Uniform Consumer Sales
9
Practices Act. These state statutory fraud laws are often called state
8.
9.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
JONATHON SHELDON & CAROLYN CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES § 3.4.2 (6th ed. 2004). Although commentators use different
organizing schemes for state “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” (UDAP)
laws, these four categories generally cover the most commonly used groupings of
these laws. See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection
Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 366–67
(1992). See also Albert N. Shelden, State Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition,
SF74 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 501 (2001); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 446–48
(1991); Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427, 427–30,
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“UDAP” laws, after the FTC phrase prohibiting “unfair and
10
deceptive acts and practices.”
The FTC is charged with public enforcement of section 5 of
the FTC Act, and state attorneys general are typically the public
11
enforcers of state statutory fraud laws.
A critical difference
between the FTC Act and state statutory fraud laws is that section 5
of the FTC Act has no private right of action. All states except Iowa
12
have a private right of action for violation of statutory fraud laws.
In most states, the private right of action includes the right to
recover attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs, the right to
13
multiplied or enhanced damages, or both.
Minnesota has enacted two of these forms of statutory fraud
laws: the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and the UDTPA. The
Minnesota CFA prohibits the “act, use, or employment by any
person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise,
14
misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice.”
The UDTPA lists twelve acts that are prohibited when made by a
person “in the course of business, vocation, or occupation,” and
generally prohibits conduct that “similarly creates a likelihood of
15
confusion or of misunderstanding.” Minnesota is one of only five
states with both a consumer fraud act and an UDTPA version of a
16
statutory fraud law.
In addition, Minnesota has another, older statutory fraud law
17
entitled the False Statement in Advertising Act (“FSAA”). The
FSAA prohibits an advertisement “which contains any material
assertion, representation, or statement of fact which is untrue,
18
deceptive, or misleading.”
This FSAA is a form of a model law

465–72. (1984).
10. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 9, § 1.1.
11. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 77–78
(2004) [hereinafter “ABA”].
12. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 9, § 8.2.
13. ABA, supra note 11, at 85–86.
14. MINN. STAT. § 325F.69, subdiv. 1 (2004).
15. MINN. STAT. § 325D.44, subdiv. 1 (2004).
16. Delaware and Illinois, like Minnesota, have adopted separate CFA and
UDTPA statutes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2513 (CFA), 2532 (UDPTA) (2005);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 505/2 (CFA), 510/2 (UDTPA) (West 2001). Alaska
and West Virginia have incorporated the CFA into a UDTPA-type statute. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104 (West 2001).
17. MINN. STAT. § 325F.67 (2004). The FSAA was initially adopted in 1913,
MINN. STAT. § 8903 (supp. 1913).
18. Id.
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known as a “Printer’s Ink” statute, which was named for an
advertising industry trade journal that published the model law and
19
urged its adoption at the turn of the twentieth century.
2.

Topical Consumer Protection Laws

Minnesota, like most other states, has a broad array of topical
20
consumer protection laws targeting specific types of transactions.
Automobile buyers, for instance, have protections in Minnesota law
related to previously salvaged cars, accuracy of odometer readings,
or when they purchase a “lemon,” buy a service contract, obtain
repairs, or finance their purchase of a motor vehicle, among other
21
matters.
Vacation travelers who buy timeshares, travel-club
memberships or camping memberships all receive state law
protections in statutes meant to regulate these particular
22
purchases.
State topical consumer protection laws also govern
merchants who use specific types of sales practices. For example,
businesses are constrained in their actions when contacting
consumers through automatic-dialing machines, unsolicited
facsimile transmissions or emails, when sending and billing for
23
unsolicited goods, or during door-to-door sales.
There are dozens of other topical consumer protection laws in
Minnesota meant to provide protections for specific types of
marketplace transactions or sales tactics. From 2002 through 2005,
Minnesota enacted new topical consumer protections relating to:
homeowners in foreclosure, cell phone users entering long-term
contracts, the use of private data by internet service providers, the
sale of high-cost membership travel clubs, and a state do-not-call list
24
for telemarketers.
19. 3 GEORGE ERIC ROSDEN & PETER ERIC ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING §
40.02 (2004).
20. See generally SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 9, § 5 (detailing various types
of topical consumer protection laws).
21. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.29 (Motor Vehicle Service Contracts), 168.66 (Service
Contracts), 168A.151 (Salvage Titles), 325E.14 (Odometers Prohibited Acts),
325F.59 (Repairs), 325F.665 (Purchase of New Motor Vehicles/Lemon Law)
(2004).
22. Id. §§ 82A.01–.26 (Membership Camping Practices), 83.20–.45
(Subdivided Lands), 325G.50–.505 (Membership Travel Contracts).
23. Id. §§ 325E.26 (Automatic Dialing-Announcing Devices), 325E.395
(Facsimile Transmission of Unsolicited Advertising Materials), 325F.694 (Emails),
325G.01 (Effect of Delivery), 325G.06–.11 (Home Solicitation Sales).
24. Id. §§ 325M.01–.09 (Internet Privacy), 325N.01–.09 (Mortgage
Foreclosures), 325E.311–.316 (Telephone Solicitation), 325F.695 (Consumer
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The extension and collection of credit is an area of particular
attention for topical consumer protection laws. The U.S. Congress
has enacted statutory schemes regulating credit access and
reporting, disclosure of credit terms and use of credit cards, debt
collection, real estate and mortgage transactions, leasing, and
25
electronic funds transactions. Unlike section 5 of the FTC Act,
the federal statutory fraud law, these consumer credit statutes each
26
contain an express private right of action. Minnesota regulates
credit against this background of extensive federal regulation. For
example, Minnesota has supplemented federal mortgage
regulation with statutes allowing homeowners to cancel private
mortgage insurance based on appreciation of home value,
requiring written and enforceable interest-rate lock agreements,
27
and limiting fees and excessive prepayment penalties.
3.

Enforcement of Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws

The attorney general is responsible for public enforcement of
28
The attorney general is
Minnesota’s statutory fraud laws.
authorized in Minnesota Statutes section 8.31 to seek injunctive
relief and civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation of these
29
laws. Minnesota courts have held that the attorney general can
seek restitution to consumers for a violation of these laws, and
section 8.31 has been amended to reflect this power of the attorney
30
general. In addition, the CFA contains its own statutory injunctive
Protection for Wireless Customers), 325G.505 (Membership Travel Contracts in
Excess of $500).
25. See generally Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§
2601–2617 (2000) (implemented in HUD Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500);
Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 (HOPA), 12 U.S.C. § 4901 (2000)
(implemented in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.31–.34); Truth-in-Lending Act
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1666j (2000) (implemented in Federal Reserve
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§
1681–1681u (2000); Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–
1691f (2000) (implemented in Federal Reserve Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202);
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o (2000); and
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2000)
(implemented in Federal Reserve Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205).
26. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640, 1681n–1681p, 1693m
(2000).
27. MINN. STAT. §§ 47.206–.207, 58.137 (2004).
28. Id. § 8.01, .31–.32.
29. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3.
30. State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Products, Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 896
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993); Act of June 2, 1987,
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authority for the attorney general, and the FSAA provides that a
violation is a misdemeanor that can be prosecuted by county
31
attorneys.
Section 8.31 also contains Minnesota’s private right of action
for its general statutory fraud laws. Subdivision 3a of section 8.31 is
known as “the private attorney general statute.” The private
attorney general statute provides an express right for “any person
injured by a violation [of the laws enumerated in section 8.31 to]
bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and
disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable
32
attorney’s fees.”
The CFA and FSAA are included in the list of laws
33
“enumerated” in subdivision 1 of section 8.31. The UDTPA is not
expressly included in subdivision 1 of section 8.31, but that
subdivision provides a broad grant of authority to the attorney
general to enforce laws “respecting unfair, discriminatory, and
other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade, and
34
specifically, but not exclusively” the laws listed thereafter. Several
Minnesota courts, both state and federal, have held that because
the UDTPA is not expressly listed, it is not within the purview of the
private attorney general statute and there is no private right of
35
action for damages. The UDTPA contains its own authority for a
private right of action, but that authority is limited to injunctive
36
relief.

ch. 366, §§ 2, 4, 1987 Minn. Laws 2538, 2538–39 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. § 8.31, subdivs. 2c, 3c (2004)).
31. MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.67, 325F.70, subdiv. 1 (2004).
32. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a.
33. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 1.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. 991550, 2001 WL 821831
(D. Minn. Jul. 5, 2001); Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 476 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999) (collecting cases). Although a critique of these cases is beyond the
scope of this article, it is noteworthy that none of theses cases have analyzed the
question in depth. In particular, none of these cases have considered the
interpretive relevance of other statutes that have incorporated the UDTPA or
“deceptive trade practices” phrase together with the other two general statutory
fraud laws, including Minnesota Statutes sections 58.08, 325F.71, 325G.505,
327B.05 (subdivision 1(d)), and 609.2336. Nor have these cases addressed the fact
that the UDTPA was passed in the same legislative session as the private attorney
general statute, meaning that the UDTPA was not in existence at the time the
private attorney general statute was introduced as legislation. See 1973 Minn. Laws
296 (private attorney general statute); 1973 Minn. Laws 420 (UDTPA).
36. MINN. STAT. § 325D.45, subdiv. 1 (2004).
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Topical consumer protection laws have varying private
enforcement mechanisms. A few of these statutes contain no
private right of action. A substantial number of topical statutes
with an express private right of action incorporate, directly or
indirectly, the private attorney general statute as the enforcement
37
provision. Some statutes expressly reference section 8.31. Other
such statutes state that a violation constitutes a per se violation of the
CFA, or otherwise reference the CFA for enforcement, thereby
38
indirectly allowing suit under the private attorney general statute.
A few statutes incorporate both section 8.31 and the CFA in some
39
manner. Several statutes have both an independent private right
40
of action and reference the private attorney general statute.
The language incorporating the private attorney general
statute in these topical consumer laws varies tremendously. For
example:
• A person suffering injury because of a violation of the
law regulating prize solicitations has a private right of
action in the law, but a violation of that law “also [is] a
violation of sections 325F.68 to 325F.71 and is subject
41
to section 8.31.”
•

The “immigration services” statute provides consumer
protections for immigrants who pay for services related
to gaining U.S. citizenship or related matters: “The
penalties and remedies of section 8.31 apply to
violations of this section, including a private cause of
42
action.”

•

A violation of the law regulating industrial hygiene and
safety professionals “is an unlawful practice under

37. See, e.g., Id. §§ 325E.31 (automatic dialing/announcing devices),
325F.245, subdiv. 7 (landscape application contracts), 325G.10 (home solicitation
sales), 325G.14 (personal solicitation of sales).
38. See, e.g., Id. §§ 148.5198, subdiv. 5 (hearing aid sales contracts), 184.33,
subdiv. 2 (employment agent licenses), 327C.07, subdiv. 6 (manufactured home
park contracts).
39. See, e.g., Id. §§ 325F.97, subdivs. 1–2 (rental purchase agreements), 332.59
(credit services organizations).
40. See, e.g., Id. §§ 325E.33, subdivs. 3–4 (misconduct of athletic agents),
325F.63, subdiv. 3 (service repairs), 325F.6643 (auto title branding).
41. Id. § 325F.755, subdiv. 7(b).
42. Id. § 325E.031, subdiv. 6.
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section 325F.69. A person who violates section 182A.04
is subject to the remedies provided in sections 325F.68
43
to 325F.70.”
•

A violation of the law regulating agriculture contracts
“is a violation subject to section 8.31, subdivision 1,
[but] the remedies in section 8.31, subdivisions 3 and
44
3a, are limited by section 17.9441.”

B. Progressive Enforcement of State Consumer Protection Laws
For purposes of this article, “progressive” consumer protection
enforcement means lawsuits that have the effect of rectifying an
imbalance of power between consumers and the sellers who
typically control the terms of marketplace transactions. Minnesota
courts have repeatedly stated that an underlying purpose of
Minnesota UDAP law is to address the problem of lesser bargaining
power by consumers. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed that “one of the central purposes of the Consumer
Fraud Act is to address the unequal bargaining power that is often
45
found in consumer transactions.”
Consumer protection laws are the progeny of “progressive”
traditions in American politics. The original consumer protection
laws were the result of reform notions rooted in the Progressive
movement of the early twentieth century. One fundamental
concern reflected in Progressive-era legislation was the use of
government power to remedy the unequal bargaining power of the
individual. Antitrust law, union protections, food safety, and other
such regulations were enacted in part to offset control by
increasingly large and powerful corporations of the labor and
46
consumer marketplace. The first nonprofit consumer advocacy
43. Id. § 182A.05.
44. Id. § 17.944, subdivs. 7–8.
45. Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Minn. 2004).
See also Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002 (D.
Minn. 2003); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2000); First Nat’l Bank of
North v. Miller Schroeder Fin., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006);
D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Love v. Amsler, 441
N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
46. JOHN F. WALKER & HAROLD G. VATTER, THE RISE OF BIG GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 19–20 (1997); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the “Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 333 (1999).
See generally MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND
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organizations, such as the National Consumer’s League, came into
47
existence at this time.
The progressive era offered inspiration, but the enactment of
modern consumer protection laws started with the New Deal and
48
came to fruition in a flurry of activity in the 1960s and 1970s. The
grandfather of statutory fraud laws, the “unfair and deceptive acts
and practices” language in section 5 of the FTC Act, was inserted
49
into the FTC Act in 1938. In the 1960s and 1970s, both federal
and state governments enacted a range of consumer protection
laws, including the widespread adoption of state statutory fraud
laws, consumer credit protections, and topical consumer laws. Like
progressive-era reform activities, consumer protection laws were
enacted in part to remedy the unequal bargaining power of
individual consumers in a marketplace dominated by large
50
corporations.
For the courts of the first half of the twentieth century,
progressive legal thinkers measured success, in part, by overturning
the prevailing judicial philosophy of formalistic notions of
“freedom of contract” that stood in the way of government
regulation to correct market power imbalances. The Lochner-era
Court found due process constitutional protection for freedom of
51
contract as justification for overturning Progressive legislation.

ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933 (1990). Keller also describes the rise of
consumerism and consumer debt, especially related to automobile purchase, as
part of the economic change occurring in the era. Id. at 13–14. Many scholars
note the enactment of these regulatory schemes but argue that the Progressive era
was a conservative movement controlled by the business interests ostensibly being
regulated.
See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916, at 2 (1963).
47. Patricia M. Kuntze, Communicating With The FDA: The Office Of Consumer
Affairs, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 16 (1993).
48. Franke & Ballam, supra note 9, at 355. See also Kuntze, supra note 47, at 16
(describing the consumer movement to protect from unsafe products as occurring
in three phases: “the Progressive Era, when consumers were seen as gullible; the
New Deal, when consumers were viewed as targets of the dangers of available
foods and drugs; and the 1960s and 1970s, when consumers became tied to larger
citizen movements”).
49. Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2000)).
50. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1283–84 (1986). See also DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW §
3.2 (2005) (describing one of the reasons for the enactment of state statutory
fraud laws as “a perceived inequality of bargaining power between merchants and
consumers”).
51. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Progressive legal thinkers of the time “came to focus on the
unfairness involved in the enforcement of contracts that resulted
52
from greatly unequal bargaining power.”
Legal realism emerged as a response to the Lochner Court
philosophy and took center stage with the New Deal, continuing a
focus on government power as a remedy to unequal marketplace
bargaining. William H. Page makes explicit the link between legal
realism, Progressive-era theory and imbalance of market power:
At the heart of the [legal realist] challenge was an attack
on the dichotomy between freedom of contract and
coercive state intervention. Realists argued that the
“private” market was simply one form of coercive state
ordering. Robert Lee Hale, in particular, attempted to
show that the common law market permitted the powerful
to coerce the weak: “Each party to a bargain is forced by
the bargaining power of the other to surrender certain
property... or his freedom to act.... The economically
strong retain a considerable residuum of liberty and
property; the economically weak, very little.”... [I]t bears
emphasizing that these perspectives in New Deal ideology
were not new.
They were direct descendants of
53
progressive-era reform movements.
From the far right of the political spectrum, a Cato Institute
publication has cited the same underlying principles for
progressive legal traditions:
As Epstein details, the Progressives, led by Justices Louis
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, overthrew nearly a
century-and-a-half of constitutional learning in the service
of a single dubious economic theory: that economic
‘progress’ required the creation of state-run monopolies
to remedy the supposedly weak bargaining position of
54
consumers and laborers.
Thus, the ideological underpinnings of modern state
consumer protection laws, at least in substantial part, are literally
Progressive in origin. They focus on protecting the consumer by
52. Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound:
An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV 1915, 1916 (1995).
53. William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44
EMORY L.J. 1, 13 (1995). But see James A. Henretta, Charles Evan Hughes and the
Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 115 (2006) (arguing that the
prevailing view of the New Deal courts is inaccurate and its decisions were
antithetical to progressive-era ideals).
54. Mark K. Moller, Introduction, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2005).
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using government regulation to balance what Progressive thinkers
have long considered to be the unfair bargaining power possessed
by larger, more sophisticated marketplace sellers.
Development of consumer protection law in Minnesota falls
squarely within the national pattern for passage of consumer
protection legislation. Minnesota enacted a range of Progressiveera legislation, and some prominent United States Supreme Court
cases of the first half of the twentieth century concerned Minnesota
55
statutes designed to protect farmers and consumers. Minnesota’s
first statutory fraud law also came into existence during the
Progressive era with the enactment in 1913 of the model Printer’s
56
Ink statute in the form of the FSAA.
As with the rest of the nation, Minnesota created the core of its
state consumer protection laws during an approximately twentyyear period beginning in the early 1960s. The CFA and the
UDTPA were passed in 1963 and 1973, respectively, to make it
57
easier to sue for misleading and deceptive marketplace practices.
The remedial private attorney general statute provided a private
right of action for enforcement of consumer protection laws in
58
1973.
This period also included the passage of basic topical
consumer laws, many of which provide important and well-known
marketplace protections, such as: the right to obtain a replacement
vehicle or refund for a defective new car purchase, known as the
“lemon law;” the three business day right to cancel door-to-door
sales agreements contained in the Home Solicitation Sales Act; and
the right to obtain a written repair estimate and limit liability for
59
excess costs under the Truth in Repairs Act.
Accepting for purposes of this article that individual
consumers face an unequal marketplace position, and that
correcting this unfair position through government legislation is a
social benefit, brings us to the central question of this article: is
Minnesota progressive in terms of private enforcement of
consumer protections laws? In other words, can consumers
effectively enforce Minnesota consumer protection laws to remedy
unequal marketplace bargaining power? The private attorney

55. See, e.g., Henretta, supra note 53, at 137 (Minnesota rate regulation), 153–
54 (Minnesota mortgage moratorium).
56. MINN. STAT. § 8903 (1913 & Supp. 1917).
57. 1963 Minn. Laws 1533; 1973 Minn. Laws 420.
58. 1973 Minn. Laws 296.
59. MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.56, .665, 325G.06–.10 (2004).
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general statute, the primary vehicle for private enforcement of
consumer protection laws, was radically reinterpreted in 2000, so I
focus the analysis on this development.
III. JUDICIAL CREATION OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT FOR
STATUTORY FRAUD ACTIONS
The Minnesota Supreme Court charted a new course for use of
the private attorney general statute in a 2000 decision, Ly v.
60
Nystrom. This section analyzes the Ly decision and a subsequent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision on the subject, Collins v.
61
Minnesota School of Business.
A. Ly v. Nystrom
Hoang Mihn Ly immigrated to the United States from
62
He had almost no formal
Vietnam in 1981 at the age of 32.
63
education in Vietnam and neither spoke nor read much English.
Mr. Ly worked as a dishwasher and other jobs “neither requiring
64
The
nor providing any business or management experience.”
defendant in the case, Kim Nystrom, also was from Vietnam but was
65
fluent in English.
The parties had become friends when both
66
worked at a local restaurant.
In 1996, Ms. Nystrom offered to sell to Mr. Ly a restaurant
67
named Chin Yung that she owned in Shakopee, Minnesota. At
the core of the case was Ms. Nystrom’s oral statement to Mr. Ly that
Chin Yung had gross revenues of $25,000 to $30,000 per month
68
and monthly profits of $6,000 to $7,000. In truth, the restaurant’s
monthly sales were only $6,000 to $7,000, or roughly the amount
69
the defendant represented as the business’s monthly profit.
During the process of selling the restaurant, Ms. Nystrom
repeatedly told Mr. Ly that he did not need a lawyer, and that she

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).
655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003).
Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 306.
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70

would not lie to him because they were friends. When Mr. Ly and
his family first assumed control of the restaurant and complained
to Ms. Nystrom about the lack of sales and other problems, she
responded that this may be his fate and that he should see a
71
fortune teller. When Mr. Ly fell behind in his loan payments to
Ms. Nystrom, she threatened that his credit would be ruined and
72
his home would be seized. When Ms. Nystrom, accompanied by
an insurance agent, asked Mr. Ly to execute documents allowing
her to take back control of the restaurant due to Mr. Ly’s failure to
make payments, Mr. Ly indicated that he wanted a lawyer to
73
Ms. Nystrom
evaluate the papers she was asking him to sign.
responded that failure to sign the documents by the next day would
lead the police to take control of the restaurant, and that if Mr. Ly
74
tried to get in, “they will lock you up.”
Mr. Ly eventually agreed to return control of the restaurant to
75
Ms. Nystrom.
Ms. Nystrom gave Mr. Ly a check for $2,500,
allegedly to help him support his family, but she immediately
76
stopped payment on the check.
The same day Ms. Nystrom
assumed control of the restaurant from Mr. Ly, she sold it to
77
another buyer.
Mr. Ly filed suit against Ms. Nystrom alleging violations of
78
common law fraud and the CFA. The trial court found for Mr. Ly
79
on the common law fraud claim and awarded $25,000 in damages.
The trial court, however, found the CFA inapplicable because Ms.
Nystrom’s statements were not made to the public at large and did
80
not have the potential to deceive or ensnare others. The court of
appeals upheld this decision, also finding no violation of the CFA
81
because Mr. Ly was not a “consumer.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court separated the legal issues into
82
two distinct matters. It reversed the lower court rulings as to the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 305.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307; Ly v. Nystrom, 602 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 307.
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83

CFA. The court noted that the CFA was part of a wave of state
statutory fraud laws enacted to “prohibit deceptive practices and to
address the unequal bargaining power often present in consumer
84
transactions.” The court also cited its prior statements that the
CFA should be liberally construed in favor of protecting consumers
and that the CFA reflected “a clear legislative policy encouraging
85
aggressive prosecution of statutory violations.” Relying on these
broad principles and past decisions, including the fact that the
Minnesota State Legislature had overturned one of its prior
decisions restrictively interpreting the CFA, the court reversed the
lower courts and held that deceptive practices in an “isolated oneon-one transaction” in a business context were actionable under
86
the CFA.
Ms. Nystrom, however, prevailed in the case. The Court
87
looked to the private attorney general statute to insert limitations
88
The court noted that the
it found missing under the CFA.
favorable remedies in the private attorney general statute “raised
concern about how broadly the legislature intended the statute to
be applied, particularly as it relates to common law fraud actions
89
and recovery of attorney fees.” In particular, the court noted the
use by the Minnesota Court of Appeals of Justice Simonett’s dissent
in Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., a previous
decision interpreting the private right of action in the context of a
90
CFA claim. In that case, a church was held to have a right to bring
a CFA action after being deceived in the purchase of building
91
construction services. Justice Simonett, in his Church of Nativity
dissent, proposed a four-part test for limiting the award of attorney
92
fees in CFA cases under the private attorney general statute. One
of these four requirements was that the “plaintiff’s lawsuit has been

83. Id. at 310.
84. Id. at 308.
85. Id. (citing State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495–96 (Minn.
1996)).
86. Id. at 310.
87. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004).
88. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314.
89. Id. at 311.
90. Id. at 312 (citing Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992)).
91. Id. at 311 n.16.
92. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 11
(Minn. 1992).
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93

of benefit to the public.”
Without adopting the Simonett dissent, the court in Ly
announced a “public benefit” limit on use of the private attorney
general statute, restricting it to only “those claimants who
94
demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.” The
legal support for this holding was the court’s finding that the
private attorney general statute provided individual recourse only if
the cause of action would also have been within the attorney
95
general’s authority to bring suit. The court stated that “the role
and duties of the attorney general with respect to enforcing the
fraudulent business practices laws must define the limits of the
private claimant under the statute” and that “[s]ince the Private AG
Statute grants private citizens the right to act as a ‘private’ attorney
general, the role and duties of the attorney general with respect to
enforcing the fraudulent business practices laws must define the
96
limits of the private claimant under the statute.” Both statute and
case law limit the attorney general’s authority to matters of public
interest, the court reasoned, and thus the private right of action
97
under section 8.31 should be so limited.
Rather than remand Mr. Ly’s case to the trial court for
determination as to whether he met this newly imposed
requirement, the court held as a matter of law that his case had no
98
public benefit, and thus upheld dismissal of his CFA claim. The
only fact relied on to support this conclusion was that Mr. Ly “was
defrauded in a single one-on-one transaction in which the
fraudulent misrepresentation, while evincing reprehensible
99
conduct, was made only to appellant.”
The dissenters, Justices Page and Gilbert, stressed that section
8.31 unambiguously states that “any person injured by a violation of
the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action,” with
100
the CFA specifically enumerated under subdivision 1.
The
dissent noted that an unambiguous statute should be given its plain
meaning, and observed that there is no ambiguity in the language
93. Id.
94. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 313.
97. Id. at 313–14.
98. Id. at 314.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 315 (Page, J., dissenting in part and Gilbert, J., dissenting in part)
(citing MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004)).
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of the private attorney general statute allowing adoption of a public
101
benefit limitation on suits for CFA violations. Justice Gilbert also
argued that any successful prosecution of the CFA “has benefited
the public by attempting to prevent the fraudulent business
conduct of that particular defendant and alleviating, economically
and in terms of time and preparation for investigation and
litigation, the burden on the attorney general’s office to enforce
102
the laws.”
Thus, to the extent that the court read a “public
benefit” requirement into the law, Justice Gilbert argued for
finding that a successful prosecution of the CFA met this
103
requirement.
B. Collins v. Minnesota School of Business
In the only post-Ly decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court
applying the public benefit limit, Collins v. Minnesota School of
Business, the court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the
trial court determination that the plaintiffs had not met the
104
requirement of showing a public benefit. The plaintiffs in Collins
were eighteen former trade school students who alleged that the
school had made false and misleading statements in violation of
both the FSAA and the CFA, inducing them to enroll in a sports
105
medicine program.
The alleged misrepresentations were made
in broadcast advertisements, in sales presentations to prospective
106
students, and in brochures.
The plaintiffs accepted a Rule 68
offer of settlement that included an award of “any costs and
107
disbursements allowed by the District Court.”
The trial court
disallowed attorney’s fees under the private attorney general
statute, finding that plaintiffs’ suit did not show a public benefit
because “only a relatively small group of persons were injured by
108
[the defendant’s] fraudulent activities.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court awarded attorney’s fees on
109
finding that the suit provided a public benefit.
The court held

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. (Page, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 316 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
Id.
655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003).
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id.
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that the trial court erred by focusing on the number of people
injured as opposed to the breadth of the sales representations,
110
which were directed “to the public at large.”
The court applied
the public benefit test to the FSAA claim, as well as the CFA
111
claim.
IV. THE NARROW CONSTRAINTS OF “PUBLIC BENEFIT” AS APPLIED IN
SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
The Minnesota Supreme Court may (or may not) have
intended Ly as a scalpel for use in selectively weeding out cases at
the margin of public concern, but whatever the court’s initial
intent, its decision has been wielded as a scythe by the lower state
courts and the federal courts to dismiss statutory fraud claims by
individuals.
A. Results of Applying the Public Benefit Limit
This section looks at the outcome of statutory fraud or topical
consumer protection law cases that imposed the public benefit
limit after Ly. The first section analyzes cases that expressly apply
the public benefit limit; the second subsection briefly notes cases
decided under statutory fraud laws permitting plaintiff claims but
112
not applying the public benefit limit.
1.

Decisions Expressly Applying the Public Benefit Limit

There is almost a perfect correlation between the outcome of
cases expressly applying the public benefit limit and whether the
plaintiff was an individual (or were family farmers), on the one
hand, or a class or group of plaintiffs on the other hand. Suits by
the former were almost uniformly dismissed as not in the public
interest; suits by the latter generally were found to be in the public
benefit.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Although Minnesota has three primary statutory fraud laws, the case law
applying the public benefit test concerns the CFA and, to a lesser extent, the
FSAA. The third statutory fraud law, the UDTPA, has been repeatedly interpreted
not to allow for a right of action under the private attorney general statute, and
thus “public benefit” is not at issue. See supra note 35.
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Suits by Individuals

The application of the public benefit limit by courts
construing Minnesota law has resulted in the rejection of every
consumer protection claim brought solely by an individual natural
person or by family members, including family farmers also suing
with a related family farm corporation. Courts in twelve cases have
expressly considered whether such plaintiffs asserting a claim
under the statutory fraud laws met the public benefit limitation
113
114
enunciated in Ly.
In every case, the court dismissed the claim.
The result has been the same regardless of the court deciding the
matter, with one decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, three Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions,
and eight decisions of the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota (“federal district court”) dismissing the
115
plaintiffs’ statutory fraud claims.
The same fate occurred with
suits filed by individual plaintiffs in two cases where the court

113. See note 115 infra.
114. See note 115infra.
115. Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (individual mortgage
borrower); Kivel v. WealthSpring Mortgage Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Minn.
2005) (individual mortgage borrower); Kalmes Farms, Inc. v. J-Star Indus., Inc.,
No. Civ. 02-1141, 2004 WL 114976 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2004) (family farm claim
against farm equipment manufacturer); Zutz v. Case Corp., No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003
WL 22848943 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003) (family farm claim against farm
equipment manufacturer); Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (D.
Minn. 2003) (individual injured by radial saw from manufacturer); Flora v.
Firepond, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 780 (D. Minn. 2003) (two holders of stock
options), aff’d sub nom. Syverson v. Firepond, Inc., 383 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2004);
Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. 99-1550, 2003 WL 1571584 (D. Minn.
Mar. 03, 2003) (trustee for next of kin in wrongful death suit); Behrens v. United
Vaccines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 965 (D. Minn. 2002) (family farm claim against
vaccine manufacturer); Pecarina v. Tokai Corp., No. Civ. 01-1655, 2002 WL
1023153 (D. Minn. May 20, 2002) (family sues manufacturer); Dickson v.
Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2005) (married
couple purchasing a boat); Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004) (farm family claim against feed seller); Scally v. Norwest Mortgage,
Inc., No. C4-02-2181, 2003 WL 22039526 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003)
(individual mortgage borrower). This listing of cases includes those with multiple
plaintiffs who are members of the same family and also includes family farm
corporations. See also Ponzo v. Affordable Homes of Rochester, No. A04-2234,
2005 WL 1804644, at *2 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005) (stating in a footnote
that a one-on-one transaction is not actionable under the CFA, but upholding CFA
claim because defendant did not raise the issue below). But see Independent Glass
Ass’n v. Safelite Group, Inc., No. 05-238, 2005 WL 2093035 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005),
which is discussed infra Part III.A.1.d. Citations to collected lower court cases in
this and subsequent notes are for decisions as of July 31, 2006.
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analyzed public benefit in the context of topical consumer
protection laws enforced under the private attorney general
116
statute.
The following three cases, involving plaintiffs who were an
individual, a married couple, and family farmers, exemplify the
exclusionary reach of the public benefit limit:
117
• Dickson v. Lundquist.
Robert and Phyllis Dickson bought a
118
The
Stratos boat from Riverview Sports & Marine in 1999.
Dicksons first encountered Riverview at a boat show where,
according to the Dicksons, they were given a brochure listing the
119
boat as a “promotional.”
They later visited the Riverview
120
dealership and were again given the brochure.
The Dicksons
allege that they were told the boat had only been used for
121
promotional purposes. In fact, the boat had been previously sold
and registered in North Carolina and returned to the dealer
122
because the prior owner was dissatisfied with it.
Riverview had
123
purchased it from the manufacturer after the return. A Riverview
salesperson informed the Dicksons that one other person was
124
interested in the boat.
The Riverview owner stated that he was
unsure how the boat was listed in the brochure, and the brochure
125
was not retained by the Dicksons.
The trial court held that the
Dickson’s evidence was “vague” and “questionable,” and found no
126
public benefit allowing for a CFA claim.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court ruling as not
clearly erroneous and found that “[t]here is no clear proof of
127
misrepresentation toward the public at large.”
The court
116. Toth v. Arason, No. A04-769, 2005 WL 1216301 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17,
2005) (attempting to enforce Truth in Repairs Act, Minnesota Statutes sections
325F.56–.66), rev. granted (Minn. July 19, 2005); Jensen v. Duluth Area YMCA, 688
N.W.2d 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (attempting to enforce Non-profit Corporation
Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 317A).
117. No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2005).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *2. The procedural posture in Dickson was similar to Collins. See
supra Part III.B. The plaintiffs had accepted a Rule 68 settlement offer and were
litigating their attorney’s fee claim. Id. at *1.
127. Id. at *2.
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rejected as hypothetical the Dicksons’ argument that this would
allow sellers to make false statements in serial fashion and escape
128
CFA liability.
The Dicksons also argued that Riverview’s false
statements were broadly distributed because they were reiterated to
the bank financing the purchase, at least one other possible
129
customer, and the Department of Motor Vehicles.
The court
acknowledged these facts, but found that it “still cannot find the
requisite showing of fraudulent inducement or public benefit
130
under Ly and Collins.”
131
The Zutz family owned and operated a
• Zutz v. Case Corp.
132
In 1998, they obtained an “air
farm in northwestern Minnesota.
drill” manufactured by Case Corporation that mixed soil, seed,
133
fertilizer, and herbicide for crop planting. According to the Zutz
family, Case’s promotional material for the product and the dealer
both stated that the air drill would work on fields treated with pre134
emergent herbicide.
Plaintiffs experienced significantly poorer
135
yields using the air drill for three years, 1998 through 2000.
During this time, the Zutz family worked with Case and the dealer
to solve the problem and received a larger Case air drill for the
136
2000 planting season.
After the 2000 crops again showed poor
yields, the Zutz family hired an agronomist, who ran dye tests and
determined that the air drill failed to properly mix and distribute
137
the inputs in soil treated with pre-emergent herbicide.
Case moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ common law fraud and
138
CFA claims.
The federal district court held that the Zutz family
had properly pleaded common law fraud but dismissed the CFA
139
claim for failure to show public benefit.
As to the public
distribution of the misleading claims, the court found that the

128. Id. at *3.
129. Id.
130. Id. The Court of Appeals also held, without citation to the law regarding
required proof for showing injury under the private attorney general statute, that
the Dicksons had to show that the false representation regarding the boat’s prior
ownership and use must have “by itself” induced them to purchase the boat. Id.
131. No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003 WL 22848943 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003).
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *6.
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“case falls between the facts of Ly and... Collins,” and noted the
representations were made in promotional materials that were
140
publicly available.
The court concluded that “[t]o determine
whether a lawsuit is brought for the public benefit the Court must
examine not only the form of the... misrepresentation, but also the
141
relief sought by the plaintiff.” The court found no public benefit
because the Zutz family sought only damages for their crop loss,
and the court held there can be no public benefit when the
142
plaintiff seeks only damages for their losses.
143
Virginia Scally sought a home
• Scally v. Norwest Mortgage.
144
From May 1998 through
refinancing loan from Wells Fargo.
November 1999 Ms. Scally engaged in a protracted interaction with
145
Wells Fargo loan officer Donald Myhre.
Ms. Scally alleged the
following: that Mr. Myhre orally promised her a six-percent loan
rate; that he failed to tell her that her loan application was denied
due to an insufficient appraisal value; that he told her to stop
making payments on her current loan; and that she attended what
she thought was a closing with Mr. Myhre on the loan in September
1999, but which Mr. Myhre considered only a “dry closing” at which
the client signs documents for use at a later, final closing on the
146
loan.
As a result of being told to stop making payments on her
147
Mr.
current home loan, Ms. Scally’s loan went into foreclosure.
Myhre personally, and ultimately Wells Fargo, made reinstatement
148
payments on the foreclosed loan.
Ms. Scally contended that the
missed mortgage payments and foreclosure caused substantial
harm to her credit and resulted in repeated denials of credit by
149
other lenders.
After discovering Myhre’s conduct, Wells Fargo
150
terminated his employment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment
for Wells Fargo on numerous claims, but it held that the trial court

140. Id. at *4.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. No. C4-02-2181, 2003 WL 22039526 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003).
144. Id. at *1. Ms. Scally originally sought the loan from Norwest Mortgage,
which later became Wells Fargo Mortgage. Id. at *1 n.1.
145. Id.at *1.
146. Id. at *1–2.
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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properly dismissed the CFA claim for failure to show public
151
benefit. The court determined that these facts fit squarely within
the holding of Ly because Scally “engaged in a one-on-one
152
transaction with Myhre.”
The court rejected the argument that
allowing a CFA claim would be of benefit to the public by providing
incentives to lenders like Wells Fargo to better supervise its loan
153
officers.
The court focused on the particular circumstances of
the case and noted that Wells Fargo had fired Myhre so that he was
154
“no longer in any position to harm the public.”
Borrowing a
phrase from a federal district court case dismissing a CFA claim,
the court held that Ms. Scally had not shown more than a
155
“metaphysical potential” of public benefit from her suit.
b.

Class Actions and Joinder Cases

In the few CFA cases that expressly apply the public benefit
limit brought in a class action or by multiple plaintiffs with joined
claims, the plaintiffs have prevailed.
As noted above, the
Minnesota Supreme Court allowed eighteen students to proceed
156
with joined FSAA and CFA claims in Collins.
In two state district
court cases, the court has permitted class action CFA claims and
157
determined that the plaintiffs’ case had a public benefit.
The
same result has occurred when the public benefit limit has been
applied to statutes other than the CFA. In three class action or
joinder cases involving the application of Minnesota Statutes
chapter 327C, which regulates mobile home parks, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has found a public benefit under Ly and allowed
158
the claim to proceed under the private attorney general statute.
151. Id. at *7.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Behrens v. United Vaccines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (D.
Minn. 2002)).
156. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003).
157. Edwards v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. CT 02-16446, 2004 WL
2137824 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2004); Ali v. Francois, No. CT 02-002459, 2003
WL 23515768 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 05, 2003). But see Weigand v. Walser Auto.
Group, Inc., No. A05-1911, 2006 WL 1529511 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006)
(finding no public benefit in putative class because of prior action by the attorney
general).
158. Burtch v. Oakland Park, Inc., Nos. A05-1585, A05-1589, A05-1587, A051588, 2006 WL 1806196 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2006); Cavanaugh v. Hometown
Am., L.L.C., No. A05-595, 2006 WL 696259 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006), rev.
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Business or Organizational Plaintiffs

Courts have rejected under the public benefit limit most, but
not all, claims where the plaintiff is a business or organization
rather than a natural person or family farm. The federal district
court refused to dismiss a suit by an auto glass repair company
159
alleging CFA violations by an insurer. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a federal district court
decision that found public benefit in a false advertising claim
brought by a business against a competitor, but held that the
purpose of the private attorney general statute would not be
160
furthered by awarding attorney’s fees.
The Minnesota Court of
Appeals allowed a suit under the private attorney general statute
161
In the
for enforcement of mobile home park regulations.
remaining six cases with a business plaintiff, the court found no
162
public benefit and dismissed statutory fraud claims.
d.

163

Independent Glass Association v. Safelite Group

The federal district court allowed an FSAA claim by an
individual to proceed in a case brought jointly by a trade
association for auto glass repair companies, a Minnesota resident
who had obtained insurance proceeds for auto glass repairs, a
similarly situated Nebraska resident and an anonymous
164
independent insurance adjuster.
The defendant in the case,

denied (Minn. May 24, 2006); Schaff v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., No. A04-1246, 2005
WL 1734031 (Minn. Ct. App. July 26, 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005).
159. Laysar, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-4584, 2005 WL
2063929 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005).
160. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2002), aff’g 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Minn. 2001).
161. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Comtys.
Income Fund, No. A05-912, 2006 WL 618932 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006), rev.
granted (Minn. May 24, 2006).
162. La Parilla, Inc. v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 04-4080, 2006 WL
2069207 (D. Minn. July 26, 2006); Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. Bd. of
Pensions v. Spherion Pac. Workforce, L.L.C.., No. 04-4791, 2005 WL 1041487 (D.
Minn. May 04, 2005); Heaven & Earth, Inc. v. Wyman Props. Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.
03-3327, 2003 WL 22680935 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2003); Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook
Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Minn. 2003); Yarian v. Rainbow Foods
Group, No. 01-1144, 2003 WL 24027721 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2003); Timeline,
L.L.C. v. Williams Holdings # 3, L.L.C., 698 N.W.2d 181, 189 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2005).
163. No. 05-238, 2005 WL 2093035 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005).
164. Id. at *2.
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165

Safelite, was a third-party administrator for insurance companies.
The trade association and the Minnesota resident alleged that
Safelite violated the FSAA and the CFA by providing to insured
consumers false and misleading information about independent
glass repair businesses who contact Safelite as part of obtaining
166
authorization for glass repairs.
The court held that the trade
association lacked standing to bring the statutory fraud claims, but
refused to grant judgment on a motion to dismiss for lack of public
167
benefit as to the statutory fraud claims by the Minnesota resident.
The court determined that this individual plaintiff may be able to
show his claim benefited the public by introducing competition
into the marketplace and ensuring the provision of more accurate
168
information to insured consumers with auto glass repair claims.
2. Statutory Fraud Decisions Permitting Plaintiffs’ Claims But Not
Addressing the Public Benefit Limit
The majority of both federal and state cases deciding statutory
fraud claims have done so without reference to the public benefit
169
limit.
After the Ly decision, courts in sixteen cases have allowed
FSAA or CFA claims to proceed or upheld FSAA or CFA judgments
for the plaintiffs. The breakdown of these sixteen cases by type of
plaintiff is as follows: eight were class actions, putative class actions
170
or multiple plaintiffs with joined claims;
five were business

165. Id. at *1.
166. Id. at *3.
167. Id. at *4–6.
168. Id. at *6. The court allowed the Minnesota resident plaintiff’s FSAA claim
to proceed, but dismissed the CFA claim as outside the scope of the CFA. Id. at
*6–8. The other two individual plaintiffs did not allege statutory fraud claims. Id.
at *6 n.5 and *8 n.7. The court also allowed an UDTPA claim by the Minnesota
resident under the private attorney general statute, but did not discuss the
contrary case law holding that the private attorney general statute does not extend
to UDTPA claims. Id. at *8. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. In a later
decision, the court dismissed the statutory fraud claims, finding that the plaintiff
could not prove he was injured or likely to be damaged. Indep. Glass Ass’n v.
Safelite Group, Inc., No. 05-238, 2005 WL 3079084, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 16,
2005).
169. See infra notes 170–172, 304 and accompanying text.
170. Andrews v. Temple Inland Mortgage Corp., No. 00-1999, 2001 WL
1136160 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2001); Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D.
Minn. 2001); Johnson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CX-01-1641, 2002 WL 1050426
(Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2002); Curtis v. Philip Morris Cos., No. PI 01-018042,
2004 WL 2776228 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 29, 2004); Mitchell v. Chicago Title Ins.
Co., No. CT 02-17299, 2004 WL 2137815 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004); Schling
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plaintiffs, primarily asserting statutory fraud claims against
171
competitors or other businesses; and only three were individual
172
plaintiffs.
In the sole permitted case brought by an individual consumer,
Freeman v. A & J Auto MN, Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals
173
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a CFA claim.
The plaintiff
in that case alleged that a dealer of used cars told her that the car
had a “salvage branded” title because of a prior theft when it was
really because the car had been declared a total loss as a result of
174
an accident.
Kivel v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc., was filed
after the statutory fraud claims in a previous suit against the
175
mortgage broker were dismissed for lack of public benefit.
The
court allowed claims that a mortgage lender had made false
statements related to the processing of the plaintiff’s loan
176
application.
In Ponzo v. Affordable Homes of Rochester, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the plaintiff’s CFA claim
because the defendant did not raise the public benefit issue before
177
the trial court.
In dicta, the court noted that a one-on-one
transaction such as the conduct at issue in the case is not actionable
v. Edina Realty Title, No. CT 02-018380, 2003 WL 23786984 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept.
9, 2003). Two cases were class actions certified by the federal district court, which
have a long and complicated history of unreported federal district orders related
to various matters in the litigation. See In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116 (8th
Cir. 2005); In re Lutheran Bhd. Variable Ins. Prods. Co. Sales Practices Litigation,
No. 99-MDL-1309, 2004 WL 2931352 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2004).
171. Wildlife Research Ctr., Inc. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d
1131 (D. Minn. 2005); AT&T Corp. v. Firmware of Minn., Inc., No. Civ. 02-1010,
2004 WL 112632 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2004); Inter-Tel, Inc. v. CA Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. Civ. 02-1864, 2003 WL 23119384 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2003); Ott v. Target
Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Minn. 2001); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leger, No.
A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
26, 2005). See also Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2
(Minn. 2001) (answering certified questions as to whether non-purchasers can
bring a CFA claim and whether proof of individual justifiable reliance is required
under the private attorney general statute).
172. Kivel v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 05-2926, 2006 WL
1579819 (D. Minn. June 1, 2006); Ponzo v. Affordable Homes of Rochester,
L.L.C., No. A04-2234, 2005 WL 1804644 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005); Freeman v.
A & J Auto MN, Inc., No. A03-153, 2003 WL 22136807 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 16,
2003).
173. Freeman, 2003 WL 22136807, at *1.
174. Id. at *4–5.
175. Kivel v. WealthSpring Mortgage Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1056 (D.
Minn. 2005).
176. Kivel, 2006 WL 1579819, at *4.
177. Ponzo, 2005 WL 1804644, at *2 n.1.
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178

in a private right of action under the CFA.
Most of the business cases involved suits between competitors,
including several federal district court decisions applying the
Lanham Act with ancillary Minnesota statutory fraud claims. In Ott
v. Target Corp., for example, the court treated an FSAA claim within
the context of the Lanham Act and held that a doll manufacturer
had raised a sufficient FSAA claim to survive summary judgment
179
against makers and sellers of alleged knock-off products.
In
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leger, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of
waste oil furnaces who sued a former distributor for selling
modified furnaces as new and for representing himself as a
180
distributor after his termination.
The Minnesota Court of
Appeals upheld a trial court judgment for the manufacturer,
finding that there was sufficient evidence that the distributor had
181
violated the CFA and allowing a partial award of attorney’s fees.
B. Rationale for Decisions Finding No Public Benefit
There are two separate rationales underlying the result in the
cases dismissed for lack of a public benefit. First, courts have
excluded CFA claims arising from the interaction between one
buyer and one seller unless the plaintiffs can establish that the
specific alleged deceptive representations were disseminated to, or
the conduct was perpetrated on, the broader public. This rationale
is generally consistent with the language used by the Minnesota
182
Supreme Court in the Ly and Collins decisions.
The federal courts have adopted a formulation of the Ly public
benefit standard which, in effect, almost categorically excludes
statutory fraud claims by individuals. In Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, the
Eighth Circuit considered a CFA claim by an individual, Anitra
Davis, who alleged that U.S. Bancorp made misrepresentations in
183
the course of attempting to arrange a home mortgage for her.
Ms. Davis argued that she met the public benefit limitation
“because her experience with U.S. Bank reflects its broad treatment

178. Id.
179. 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 & n.10, 1074 (D. Minn. 2001).
180. No. A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391, *1–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2005).
181. Id. at *15.
182. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 310 (Minn. 2000); Collins v. Minn. Sch. of
Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 329–30 (Minn. 2003).
183. 383 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2004).
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184

of others.” The court rejected this claim, stating:
That argument, however, is the very foundation for the
limitation elaborated in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314. The class
of plaintiffs under the private attorney general statute
would be limitless if we assumed that one individual’s
negative experience with a company was necessarily
duplicated for every other individual and on that basis
treated personal claims as benefiting the public. Such an
assumption might well render nearly every private suit
alleging fraud a public benefit case. Davis had a private
transaction with U.S. Bank in which poor communication
and confusion on both sides resulted in the cancellation
of a purchase agreement. But Davis can complain only
about her individual experience with U.S. Bank, and she
has not presented evidence that misrepresentations were
185
made to the public at large.
Federal district court cases have summarized the public benefit
limit as a near-blanket exclusion of individual claims, with
statements such as: “the CFA does not provide a private right of
186
action to individual consumers in ‘one-on-one’ transactions.”
Also, “[g]enerally, the Consumer Fraud Act does not provide a
private right of action to individual consumers. In limited
circumstances, however, private remedies may be available through
187
the Private Attorney General Act.”
A second rationale for these decisions is not readily apparent
from a reading of the Ly and Collins decisions. This rationale
focuses on the relief sought by the plaintiff rather than whether the
defendant’s representation or conduct was directed to the general
public. In these cases, courts dismissed CFA claims because the
plaintiff could not obtain relief to benefit the public by stopping
184. Id. at 768.
185. Id.
186. Indep. Glass Ass’n v. Safelite Group, Inc., No. 05-238, 2005 WL 2093035,
at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2005); Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. Bd. of
Pensions v. Spherion Pac. Workforce L.L.C., No. 04-4791, 2005 WL 1041487, at *3
(D. Minn. May 4, 2005).
187. Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1019 (D. Minn.
2003). See also Laysar, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-4584,
2005 WL 2063929, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005); Pecarina v. Tokai Corp., No.
Civ. 01-1655, 2002 WL 1023153, at *5 (D. Minn. May 20, 2002) (stating that
“[n]either the Consumer Fraud Act nor the False Advertising Act provide a private
right of action to individual consumers. In limited circumstances, however,
private remedies may be available to individuals through the Private Attorney
General Act.”).
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continued deceptive conduct by the defendant, even though there
was no dispute in many cases that the alleged deceptive
representations or conduct was widely disseminated. In several
cases, the court held that there was no public benefit because the
defendant withdrew the product and accompanying sales program
188
from the market by the time of the court’s decision. Courts have
also found that the plaintiff’s failure to request injunctive relief,
seeking instead only damages, is a basis for finding no public
189
benefit.
The federal district court found that no CFA claims are
possible in a wrongful death suit in Minnesota, even if based on
widely disseminated deceptive sales representations, because no
public benefit can be shown when Minnesota law limits wrongful
death actions to the recovery of pecuniary loss for surviving family
190
members.
Similarly, in a decision following a reversal and
remand by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s suit in Wiegand v. Walser Automotive
Group provided no public benefit because the Attorney General
had already reached a settlement with the defendant that provided
for both injunctive relief and arbitration rights for aggrieved
191
consumers.
V. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT OVERTURNED PRIOR CASE LAW
The public benefit limit contradicts long-standing notions
about, and use of, the private right of action to enforce violations
of Minnesota statutory fraud laws. The court in Ly did not
acknowledge this prior case law. Instead, the Ly decision stated
188. Berczyk, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 n.18; Behrens v. United Vaccines, Inc.,
228 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (D. Minn. 2002); Pecarina, 2002 WL 1023153, at *5 n.3.
See also Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. 99-1550, 2003 WL 1571584, at *6
(D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2003) (holding that FDA-imposed warnings on smokeless
tobacco accomplish the purpose of warning the public, and finding no public
benefit).
189. Kalmes Farms, Inc. v. J-Star Indus., Inc., No. Civ. 02-1141, 2004 WL
114976, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2004); Zutz v. Case Corp., No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003
WL 22848943, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003); Behrens, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 972;
Pecarina, 2002 WL 1023153, at *5.
190. Tuttle, 2003 WL 1571584, at *7.
191. No. A05-1911, 2006 WL 1529511, at *3 (D. Minn. June 6, 2006) (stating
that “there is no longer any public benefit to protect because the attorney
general’s office has already intervened to correct the complained-of sales activity
and provided a remedy for aggrieved consumers”). See also Tuttle, 2003 WL
1571584, at *6.
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that its ruling was consistent with lower court decisions under the
private attorney general statute, and decisions from courts in other
192
states.
These decisions, however, stand for very different
propositions.
A. Prior Case Law Involving Claims In One-On-One Transactions
Prior to Ly, individual plaintiffs routinely used the CFA and
FSAA to obtain recoveries in situations of “one-on-one
193
Examples of reported decisions by the Minnesota
transactions.”
Court of Appeals in cases of this nature include the following: an
individual who hired a household goods moving company; a family
that made an investment at a bank; a contractor who purchased a
“garage kit;” an individual who bought a horse; and a farmer who
194
bought grain silos. The Ly decision made no mention of these or
numerous other similar cases whose result it almost surely
overturned.
In addition to reaching a different result, prior cases employed
legal principles and presumptions for the application of the private
attorney general statute that are directly contrary to the public
benefit limit doctrine. Earlier cases presumed that the primary
reason for passage of the private attorney general statute was to
allow, not exclude, suits in individual, one-on-one transactions
involving small sums of money. In a 1998 federal district court
decision, Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., the plaintiffs were a married
couple seeking damages for the wife’s sterility resulting from use of

192. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312 & n.18 (Minn. 2000).
193. Kronebusch v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 488 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Elgharbawi v. Selly, 483 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); LeSage v.
Norwest Bank Calhoun-Isles, N.A., 409 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Eager
v. Siwek Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Yost v.
Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
194. Kronebusch, 488 N.W.2d at 490 (farmer purchasing grain storage silos);
Elgharbawi, 483 N.W.2d at 490 (individual hired a household goods moving
company); LeSage, 409 N.W.2d at 536 (family making an investment); Eager, 392
N.W.2d at 691 (contractor purchasing a “garage kit”); Yost, 373 N.W.2d at 826
(individual purchasing a horse). The same is true of cases brought by individuals
enforcing topical consumer protection laws enforceable through the private
attorney general statute. See, e.g., infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text
(discussing the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Jacobs v. Rosemount DodgeWinnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981) (mobile home owners have claim
for violation of topical consumer protection law enforceable as per se violation of
the CFA)).
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195

the defendant’s contraceptive device. The plaintiff asserted CFA
196
The court
and FSAA claims, among other causes of action.
rejected an argument by defendant Searle that the private attorney
general statute is limited to situations of “direct buyer-to-seller sales
in cases which occur too quickly or on too small a scale to bring the
197
attorney general’s enforcement powers to bear.” The court cited,
in part, a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, Liess v. Lindemyer, in
agreeing with Searle that “[i]t is without doubt that a primary
purpose in adopting the private attorney general provisions of the
Consumer Fraud Act was to encourage lawyers to accept cases
where damages may be so small as to erect ‘financial barriers to the
198
vindication of a plaintiff’s right.’” The court held that suits under
the private attorney general statute should not be limited only to
199
these small matters that were its “primary purpose.” Similarly, in
a 1992 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, Kronebusch v. MVBA
Harvestore System, the court allowed recovery under the private
attorney general statute in a FSAA claim by a farmer involving his
purchase of grain storage silos, even though the court agreed that
“the primary purpose of the statute is to encourage lawyers to
accept cases where nominal damages erect financial barriers to
200
litigation.”
The courts in Kociemba and Kronebusch were struggling with the
legal issue of whether the private attorney general statute extended
beyond individual marketplace transactions involving small sums.
The public benefit limit turns this earlier framework on its head,
finding that the private attorney general statute has the opposite
purpose of precluding a private right of action in small, individual
transactions.
The public benefit limit also represents a break from longstanding case law holding that establishing liability for common law
fraud is sufficient to sustain a CFA claim in a private right of action.
201
In the 1985 case Yost v. Millhouse, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
found that a seller of a horse misrepresented whether the horse was
195. 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989).
196. Id. at 1523 (the other causes of action included “defective design,
defective manufacture, failure to warn, [and] failure to test”).
197. Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (D. Minn. 1988).
198. Id. (citing Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984)).
199. Id.
200. 488 N.W.2d 490, 494–95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
201. 373 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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195

registered and the court awarded $50 in damages under the
202
The court held that as a
plaintiff’s common law fraud claim.
result of finding for the plaintiff on common law fraud: “[a]s a
matter of law, the fraud constitutes a violation of the Consumer
Protection Act for which reasonable attorney’s fees are
203
recoverable.”
Ly held the opposite—that the plaintiff had no
right to bring a private right of action to recover damages for a
violation of the CFA even though the defendant had been found
204
liable under common law fraud.
B. Public Benefit Limits Imposed in Other Cases and Jurisdictions
The Court in Ly noted three Minnesota Court of Appeals
decisions, as well as cases from other jurisdictions with similar
court-imposed requirements. Each of the cited decisions counsels
rejection, not adoption, of the public benefit limit.
1.

Minnesota Court of Appeals Cases Cited in Ly

The Court in Ly cited three Minnesota Court of Appeals cases
that it read as requiring “a showing of public benefit to award
205
attorney fees under the Private AG Statute.”
The reasoning and
result of these cases is utterly incompatible with the public benefit
limit for the same three reasons in each case: (1) the case would
have been dismissed under the public benefit limit; (2) the court
awarded or increased attorney’s fees under the private attorney
general statute because doing so was necessary to promote claims
by individuals, including possible plaintiffs with nominal damages;
and (3) the court used “public interest” as a factor to determine

202. Id. at 830–31.
203. Id. at 831.
204. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).
205. Id. at 312. The Court also cited two federal district court cases as support
for imposing the public benefit limit. See id. at 312 n.18. In Cooperman v. R.G. Barry
Corp., the court was interpreting the reach of the CFA itself, not the private
attorney general statute. 775 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Minn. 1991). The court held that
an employment dispute did not occur “in connection with the sale of any
merchandise,” as required to prove a CFA claim. Id. at 1213 (citing MINN. STAT. §
325F.69 (2004)). Given the Ly court’s sharp distinction between the requirements
for liability under the CFA and the scope of the private attorney general statute,
Cooperman is irrelevant to the issue before the Court in Ly. The other case cited by
the court, Martin v. Hancock, was literally a dog bite case decided under federal
civil rights law with no discussion remotely related to excluding all one-on-one
transactions from a private right of action. 466 F. Supp. 454 (D. Minn. 1979).
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the amount of the fee award, not as a precondition to a private
action to enforce statutory fraud laws.
In Liess v. Lindemyer, the plaintiff was an individual who
206
brought a CFA claim relating to the sale of her home, a typical
one-on-one transaction not actionable under the public benefit
207
limit. Liess prevailed at trial and was awarded $6,787.
Ms. Liess
requested over $12,000 in attorney’s fees but was awarded only
$2,500 by the trial court on the theory that this amount
208
represented a fair proportion of the damage award.
On appeal
by Liess, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the attorney’s
fee award and stated that hourly attorney’s fee awards were
appropriate even if the fees exceeded the amount of the damage
209
award.
The court held that the purpose of the private attorney
general statute was to “eliminate financial barriers to the
vindication of a plaintiff’s rights, and the award should provide
210
incentive for counsel to act as private attorney general.”
The
court quoted extensively from a case decided under federal
consumer credit laws that noted the importance of encouraging
211
lawyers to take cases even if the damage awards are small.
The
court also mentioned that on remand the trial court should
212
consider the public interest benefit of the suit.
This statement
was made in the context of a remand to increase the amount of the
attorney’s fee for an individual plaintiff, not to preclude suits such
as the one brought by Liess.
In Wexler v. Brothers Entertainment Group, Inc., a father brought a
CFA claim against the operator of a pay-per-call telephone trivia
213
game used by his son.
The trial court granted summary
214
The
judgment to the defendant and Wexler appealed.
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, finding fact issues as to
215
liability for $11.89 in phone charges.
The court noted that the
attorney general had entered into a settlement with the defendant
for comprehensive injunctive relief, but held that the issue of

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

354 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Id.
457 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 222.
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whether Wexler could obtain further relief should be reserved until
216
The court noted in dicta that if Wexler prevailed on
after trial.
remand he was entitled to attorney’s fees, and cited Liess for the
proposition that the amount of that award should reflect the public
217
purposes of the statute.
Nothing in this ruling upholding the
right to bring a CFA claim for less than $12 after the attorney
general has reached a settlement with the defendants supports the
Ly court’s public benefit limit on bringing suit under the private
attorney general statute.
Finally, in Untiedt v. Grand Laboratories, Inc., a farmer sued a
vaccine manufacturer after use of the vaccine resulted in health
218
problems for the farmer’s cattle and reduced dairy production.
These facts are almost identical to the recent federal district court
decision in Behrens v. United Vaccines, Inc., in which the court
dismissed a CFA claim by a mink farmer as failing to meet the
219
public benefit limit.
The jury found for the Untiedts, awarding
over $1 million in damages, and the court thereafter awarded
attorney’s fees to the Untiedts as the prevailing plaintiff on the CFA
220
claim.
In upholding the award of attorney’s fees, the court of
appeals cited Liess regarding the need for providing incentives to
counsel to take such cases, and that the amount of the award
221
should include consideration of the public interest.
The court
found that the trial court’s award of fees in this case was proper
“because the agricultural community has been particularly
susceptible to misrepresentation and the possibility of an award
would provide an incentive for experienced litigators to take on
222
similar cases.”
2.

Other States With Public Benefit Limits

The court in Ly also stated that “[o]ther state courts have
223
similarly held that a public purpose must be demonstrated.” The
two decisions cited from other state courts were Lightfoot v.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 222–23 (citations omitted).
No. C4-94-772, 1994 WL 714308, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1994).
228 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969–71 (D. Minn. 2002).
Untiedt, 1994 WL 714308, at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312 n.18 (Minn. 2000).
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224

MacDonald in Washington and Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health
225
Sciences in Illinois. The experience of these states, however,
provides guidance on the difficulty of applying and sustaining the
public benefit limit rather than support for such a judicially
imposed rule.
The State of Washington has the most extensive history with a
public benefit limit and is the only other state to directly tie the
public benefit test for state statutory fraud actions to the authority
of the attorney general of the state. In Lightfoot v. MacDonald, the
Washington Supreme Court held “that an act or practice of which a
private individual may complain must be one which also would be
vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General” to support a
226
private suit under the Washington Consumer Protection Act.
In
1980, just four years after Lightfoot was decided, the Washington
Supreme Court affirmed the public interest requirement, but
abandoned the association between the reach of the private right
227
of action and the authority of that state’s attorney general.
In
Anhold v. Daniels, the court observed that “[t]he ‘Attorney General’
test for sufficiency of public interest appears to have been little
utilized or understood and apparently has yielded conflicting
228
results.”
Since Anhold, the Washington courts have continued to
struggle with applying the judicially imposed “public interest” limit.
In Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.,
decided six years later in 1986, the Washington Supreme Court
revisited the issue and substituted a five-element test for the three229
A series of commentators have
factor test articulated in Anhold.
repeatedly urged the reformation or abandonment of the
230
Washington public interest test in its various permutations.
In

224. 544 P.2d 88 (Wash. 1976).
225. 698 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
226. 544 P.2d at 90. The Washington Supreme Court relied on specific
language in the purpose statement of the Washington Consumer Protection Act
and the incorporation of a reference to the Federal Trade Commission Act as a
basis for reaching this result, neither of which are present in the relevant
Minnesota laws. Id.
227. See Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1980).
228. Id. at 187. The Ly majority noted Lightfoot as support for its decision, but
failed to note that the rationale in that case was overturned. 615 N.W.2d at 312
n.18.
229. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d
531, 535 (Wash. 1986).
230. See David J. Dove, Comment, Washington Consumer Protection Act -- Public
Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH. L. REV. 201 (1984); Susan Clyatt Lybeck,

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/3

36

Cox: Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private Enforcement
4. COX - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC

2006]

GOLIATH HAS THE SLINGSHOT

12/15/2006 1:27:43 PM

199

Hangman Ridge, the Washington Supreme Court observed that “our
231
public interest requirement has been subject to harsh criticism.”
The Ly court also cited the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act as
having been interpreted to support a public interest limit on
232
suits. In fact, the Illinois case cited by the Court in Ly explained
that the judicially created “public interest” limit on suits under the
233
Illinois CFA had been overturned by the Illinois Legislature. The
234
case of Brody v. Finch University of Health Sciences discussed a
separate “consumer nexus” requirement for finding a violation of
the Illinois CFA, which is akin to a limiting principle related to the
scope of the CFA that the Ly court rejected in reversing the
Minnesota Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a CFA
235
violation had occurred.
Note, New Consumer Protection Private Action Test: Clarification or Further Confusion?-Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 62 WASH. L. REV.
277 (1987); Jonathan A. Mark, Comment, Dispensing with the Public Interest
Requirement in Private Causes of Action Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act,
29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205 (2005); Milton G. Rowland, Comment, The Consumer
Protection Act Private Right of Act: A Reevaluation, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 673, 675–77
(1984); Susan K. Storey, Note, On the Propriety of the Public Interest Requirement in the
Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143 (1986).
231. 719 P.2d at 536.
232. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 312 n.18 (Minn. 2000).
233. Id. (“[T]he 1990 amendment to the Consumer Fraud Act dispensed with
any requirement previously imposed by the courts that a plaintiff prove a public
injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers generally to maintain an action under
the Consumer Fraud Act.” (quoting Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health Scis., 698
N.E.2d 257, 269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998))). See Act of Jan. 1, 1990, ch. 121 1/2, para.
270a, 1989 Ill. Laws 4230, 4230–31 (codified as amended at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/10a (2004 West)). See also Joseph G. Feehan, The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
and the “Public Injury” Debate, 80 ILL. B.J. 136 (1992); Clinton A. Krislov, The Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act: Hey! Where Did the Strict Constructionists Go? Judicial Add-Ons Are
Ruining a Perfectly Good Statute, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 224 (1999) (discussing
Brody and other cases reflecting judicial activism as limiting the plain language of
the Illinois CFA). The Connecticut legislature also has overturned the imposition
of a similar “public interest nexus” requirement imposed by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Ivey v. Indian Harbor Props., Inc., 461 A.2d 1369 (Conn. 1983).
Similar to the comparable Illinois statute, the law overturning this decision states:
“Proof of public interest or public injury shall not be required in any action
brought under this section.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West 2004).
Only Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, and South Carolina have remaining valid
judicial decisions creating public benefit restrictions on private suits under their
state statutory fraud laws. Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 235 (Colo. 1998); Zeeman
v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing
Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Neb. 2000); LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc.,
370 S.E.2d 711, 713 (S.C. 1988).
234. 698 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
235. Compare Brody, 698 N.E.2d at 269, with Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 308–10.
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VI. INTERPRETATIVE GAPS IN THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT
The application by Minnesota courts of the public benefit limit
in Ly raises the question of whether the Minnesota Supreme Court
intended the outcome of its decision—the virtual elimination of
236
CFA claims by individuals and family farmers.
The Ly decision
left the following four unresolved analytical problems that make
resolution of this question uncertain, or which may make the legal
underpinnings of this outcome difficult to sustain: (1) the failure to
identify specific standards for applying the public benefit limit; (2)
concerns related to tying the legal basis of the public benefit limit
to the attorney general’s authority; (3) the need for factual
development regarding the existence of a public benefit; and (4)
the failure to articulate the reach of the public benefit test for
consumer protection laws other than the CFA.
A. The Lack of Standards for Applying the Public Benefit Limit
The Ly case put no clear decisional principles in place for how
courts were to apply the “public benefit” limit.
An early
commentator on the case observed: “[T]he lack of precise
standards used by the courts in determining whether the
requirement in Ly is met has not lent much guidance to trial
courts, who are left to apply a version of Justice Potter Stewart’s ‘I
237
know it when I see it’ theory to the public benefit rule.”
In

236. The majority decision in Ly cited legislative history in support of its ruling
that private actions should be limited to the authority of the attorney general. Ly,
615 N.W.2d at 311. However, that legislative history refers specifically to claims by
individuals: “On March 8, 1973, Senator Winston Borden, author of the bill, in a
hearing before the Labor and Commerce Committee, stated that its goal was to:
‘allow the individual person to bring a civil action for the damages he sustained.’”
Id. (citation omitted). The cited legislative history further states “if a[n] individual
could bring an action, he can do some of the prosecuting, he can do some of the
enforcing, he can provide some of the protection for himself and others that the
Attorney General’s Office . . . can not do today.” Id. In its later decision in Group
Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., the court focused on the language in the
private attorney general statute allowing “any person injured” by a violation to
bring a claim, and quoted more of Senator Borden’s testimony referring to claims
by “an individual.” 621 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2001).
237. Nancy E. Brasel, Ad Hoc Deceptions in Private Disputes: When Does a Private
Plaintiff Confer a Public Benefit Under Minnesota’s Private Attorney General Statute?, 29
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 321, 331 (2002). See also Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,
No. Civ. 99-1550, 2003 WL 1571584, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2003) (citing the
Brasel article and noting that the “Ly court did not, however, set forth any
standard for determining when a cause of action benefits the public”).
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finding no public benefit in Dickson v. Lundquist, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals similarly stated: “The term ‘public benefit’ is
238
subjective... the term can be about what you want it to be.”
Even after Collins, the court has not definitively resolved
whether there is an exclusion of all “one-on-one” transactions, and
if so, what this exclusion means. In neither Ly nor Collins did the
court affirmatively state that a public benefit cannot be found in a
239
suit involving a single buyer and seller. Assuming that individual
consumers can ever prove public dissemination sufficient to sustain
an individual claim, it is unclear what a plaintiff must show to prove
public benefit and survive dismissal by the court. For example,
does the public benefit limit exclude sales transactions in which the
seller makes deceptive oral representations that may possibly be,
would probably be or definitely have been made to other
consumers? If such statements should be considered, do they have
to be the same or substantially similar to the statements made to
other consumers, or is it enough that the seller makes repeatedly
false statements of various content to different buyers? Is it enough
that similar statements were made to one other consumer, a few
other consumers, hundreds of other consumers, or broadcast to
many more? Does the severity or intentionality of the alleged
deception bear on this determination?
Nor is it clear from Ly and Collins that the public benefit limit
should require the plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief or otherwise
demonstrate that his or her particular lawsuit will effectively stop
the challenged deceptive practice, as numerous courts applying the
doctrine have held. Because the court in Ly found that the
240
transaction was a “single one-on-one transaction,” it never had to
reach the issue of whether forcing a defendant to pay individual
damages for a more widely disseminated practice was sufficient to
constitute a public benefit. In Collins, the court suggested the
opposite—that the focus on the public benefit limit is on breadth
of the sales practice, not the number of people seeking relief in the
241
suit or the impact of the relief on the broader public.
238. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2005).
239. See Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000); Collins v. Minn. Sch. Of
Bus., 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003).
240. 615 N.W.2d at 309.
241. See Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 330. In a footnote in Ly, however, the court
stated that the award of investigative fees to prevailing plaintiffs is implicit support
for its decision because investigative costs in a “private dispute . . . would be of
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B. Reference to Attorney General Authority
The one defining principle for the public benefit limit
articulated in Ly, and the only legal grounding for the decision, is
that the reach of the private right of action is the same as the limits
242
on the authority of the attorney general to enforce the CFA.
In
responding to the dissenters’ argument that the public benefit limit
was nowhere to be found in the language of section 8.31, the
majority noted that “our analysis is based on the statutory authority
243
A closer look at the authority of the
of the attorney general.”
attorney general, however, highlights a critical analytical concern
with the public benefit limit.
The attorney general’s authority to enforce consumer
protection laws is subjective and discretionary. As the Ly majority
noted, the attorney general may appear “in all civil causes of like
nature in all other courts of the state whenever, in the attorney
244
general’s opinion, the interests of the state require it.”
The Ly
majority also cited Slezak v. Ousdigian for the proposition that the
attorney general “may institute, conduct and maintain all such
actions and proceedings as he deems necessary for the... protection
245
of public rights.”
The public benefit limit, then, is based on the
“opinion” of the current attorney general who takes the actions “he
246
deems necessary” in the public interest.
This obviously is a problematic interpretative principle for
restricting a private right of action. Presumably, the attorney
general could opine as to the public interest of a particular private
action before the court, which repeatedly occurred when the state
of Washington had a similar, short-lived rule of law imposed by the
247
judiciary.
The attorney general could even issue an opinion
letter stating that there is a public benefit in the prosecution of any

benefit only to the private party defrauded.” 615 N.W.2d at 314 n.24.
242. See Ly, 615 N.W.2d 302. The court reiterated this point in AndersonJohanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn.
2002).
243. Ly, 615 N.W.2d. at 314 n.22.
244. Id. at 313 n.20 (citing MINN. STAT. § 8.01 (1998)) (emphasis added). The
attorney general also has express authority to “enforce the provisions of law
relating to consumer fraud and unlawful practices” in the CFA. MINN. STAT. §
8.32, subdiv. 2(a) (2004).
245. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313 (citing Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 308,
110 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1961)).
246. See id.
247. See Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184, 188 (Wash. 1980).
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“one-on-one” transaction, or certain types of such transactions, that
violate the CFA. In part, this was the position of Justice Gilbert’s
248
dissent.
Therefore, the meaning of Ly might change with each
successive attorney general or each opinion by the attorney
general.
The holding in Ly suggests that the attorney general would
have had no authority to bring a CFA action against the
“reprehensible conduct” of the defendant in that case if the
attorney general had decided to do so. In support of this assertion,
the Ly Court cited Humphrey v. McLaren for the proposition that “a
government litigator must take positions with the common public
good in mind, unlike the private practitioner who seeks vindication
249
of a particular result for a particular client.” The fact that public
attorneys act with different motives than the private bar is a wholly
different issue than whether the attorney general has authority to
enforce state law in a given marketplace transaction between a
buyer and seller, such as the transaction underlying Ly, if the
attorney general exercises his or her discretion to do so. Neither
McLaren nor other cases on the powers of the attorney general
prohibit the attorney general from bringing suit in a fraudulent
transaction between one buyer and one seller. Minnesota courts
have consistently held that the attorney general can determine
what constitutes the public interest for purposes of filing suit. Over
250
seventy years ago, in State ex rel. Peterson v. City of Fraser, the
Minnesota Supreme Court made clear the broad scope of the
attorney general’s power:
... [I]nasmuch as the Attorney General in his discretion
decided that he should proceed, there is nothing for any
court to pass upon as to the necessity for or policy of
proceeding. In that field, the discretion of the Attorney
General is plenary. He is a constitutional officer (Minn.
Const. art. 5, § 1), and, as such, the head of the state’s
legal department. His discretion as to what litigation shall
or shall not be instituted by him is beyond the control of
251
any other officer or department of the state.
That a public attorney must act in the public interest is not a

248.
249.
1987)).
250.
251.

Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 316 (Gilbert, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 313 n.9 (citing Humphrey v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn.
191 Minn. 427, 254 N.W. 776 (1934).
Id. at 432, 254 N.W. at 778–79.
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resolution of the analytical problem of basing a private right of
action on the subjective view of the attorney general as to what
constitutes the public interest. Nothing in the private attorney
general statute suggests that the attorney general’s discretion to
determine the public interest should be transferred wholesale to
the judiciary so that the court can decide in each case whether it
believes the private litigant is acting for the public benefit.
Consider the situation of an ill, elderly woman who owns her
home without encumbrance. She is visited by a solicitor who
convinces her to transfer to him title to the property in exchange
for three years of free rent and a package of in-home services that
he falsely claims “are worth $150,000 and will provide all your
health care and life activity needs.” In truth, the services are of
limited use to the elderly homeowner and she is faced with eviction
at the end of the three-year lease. This situation fits squarely into
the “single one-on-one transaction” described in Ly and subsequent
cases. The rationale underlying this result is that a private right of
action is not authorized in this situation because no attorney
general, regardless of his or her opinion of the public interest in
this matter, could bring a suit to remedy this conduct under the
CFA. That result seems unsupportable in Minnesota law, unless Ly
is read to impose new restrictions on the powers of the attorney
general not suggested in any prior case law and not apparent in the
express statutory powers of the office.
The cases decided thus far under the public benefit limit do
not fit comfortably within these legal underpinnings of Ly. In
Dickson, for example, the consumers were told that they were
buying a “promotional” boat used solely by the dealer when, in fact,
the boat had been previously sold and registered in North Carolina
and returned to the dealer because the prior owner was dissatisfied
252
with the boat.
The plaintiffs alleged that the representation was
253
But
made in a brochure that was given to them at a boat show.
the court disagreed and found no public benefit present in
254
Dickson.
The exact same conduct occurred, in part, in an action
255
brought by the attorney general against a Minnesota boat dealer.

252. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2005). See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
253. Id.
254. Id. at *2.
255. Compare Dickson, 2005 WL 147719, at *1, with State v. W. W. Holes Mfg.
Co., No. C6-97-1018 (Sherburne Cty. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1997) (used boat motors sold
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And there is little doubt that the attorney general would have
authority to proceed against a boat seller distributing a misleading
brochure in such circumstances.
256
The case of Zutz v. Case Corp., and similar decisions, raise the
problem of how requiring a showing of public benefit in the relief
sought by the plaintiffs fits within the rationale that the private
right of action is derivative of the attorney general’s authority.
While this restriction arguably is consistent with the overall notion
of public benefit enunciated in Ly, it is even further removed from
the language and purpose of the private attorney general statute.
Subdivision 3a of section 8.31 provides a right to recover damages
for a CFA violation but makes no express mention of an injunction
to stop future conduct, instead referring generally at the end of a
257
sentence to “other equitable relief as determined by the court.”
This focus on damages contrasts with the attorney general’s
authority in subdivision 3 of section 8.31, which is entitled
“Injunctive relief” and expressly provides injunctive authority and
the right to obtain substantial civil penalties, and the reference to
258
attorney general injunctive authority in the CFA itself.
It is not
easy to reconcile the legislature’s creation of a private right of
action containing more limited statutory remedies with a courtimposed requirement that private litigants seek remedies
equivalent to those that would be obtained by the attorney general
in prosecuting a CFA claim.
C. Fact Development of Public Benefit Limit
The public benefit limit pushes litigants to fully develop the
record on public dissemination of the sales representation at the
beginning of the litigation or face dismissal of the claim. This
creates incentives for attorneys for plaintiffs to either reject
representation or turn cases of individual loss into a class action or
as demonstrators).
256. No. Civ.02-1776, 2003 WL 22848943 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2003). See supra
Part IV.A.1.a.
257. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004).
258. Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3. There also is express statutory injunctive authority
for an injunction by the attorney general in the CFA itself. Id. § 325F.70, subdiv. 1.
The FSAA also provides that county attorneys can bring criminal actions for a
violation. Id. § 325F.67. The private attorney general statute further recognizes
the broader scope of attorney general relief in section 8.31 by providing that “[i]n
any action brought by the attorney general pursuant to this section, the court may
award any of the remedies allowable under this subdivision.” Id. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a.
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something similar in terms of discovery and proof.
Minnesota courts have a liberal standard for allowing litigants
259
to obtain discovery prior to responding to a dispositive motion.
Facts relevant to a determination of public benefit as defined in Ly
and its progeny could include the sort of sweeping discovery
requests characteristic of an attorney general investigation. A
plaintiff reasonably could inquire about defendant’s advertising
and public statements, lists of all other customers who may have
received similar representations or been subject to similar
omissions or made complaints to the defendant, training materials
for salespeople who may have been told to routinely solicit
customers in a similar manner, company operation or sales
policies, and a multitude of other information that would bear on
the defendant’s repetition of its conduct with other consumers.
This sort of discovery increases litigation costs for all parties and
often imposes burdens on the court to resolve related discovery
disputes.
Conversely, restricting plaintiffs from obtaining this sort of
information in opposition to a motion on the merits of the public
benefit limit would make it impossible for the vast majority of
potential plaintiffs to ever bring an action as an individual under
the private attorney general statute. Individual consumers often
have no way of knowing the nature or extent of a defendant’s
conduct with other consumers. As a practical matter, an individual
subject to a deceptive practice often will be unlikely to know others
who purchased the same merchandise and experienced the same
260
sales practice.
Restricting access to such discovery would place
individual consumers with CFA claims in the situation of having to
allege facts beyond their own experience with the defendant while
being denied the right to discover facts in the defendant’s
knowledge necessary to sustain the plaintiff’s claim.
The need for discovery by private plaintiffs regarding the
defendant’s broader business practices points out a relevant
difference between attorney general cases and private CFA actions.
The attorney general is given broad pre-complaint investigative
261
authority in the form of a civil investigative demand.
A private
259. See, e.g., Bixler by Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn.
1985) (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.06).
260. An exception is a false advertising case, but most consumer fraud cases
are not about broadcast or widely distributed advertising. See, e.g., supra note 171.
261. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 2 (2004). See, e.g., Kohn v. State by Humphrey,
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plaintiff lacks a similar mechanism. This asymmetry in the
authority of public and private actors seems to further undercut the
rationale in Ly that the legislature tacitly intended to treat the
private attorney general statute as co-extensive with the attorney
general authority to enforce the CFA. It seems unpersuasive that
the legislature would use broad language in describing the private
right of action (“any person injured . . . may bring a civil action”),
but intend without expressly so stating to limit that right to cases of
general public impact, while providing the attorney general—but
not private plaintiffs—with authority to uncover patterns of
conduct prior to suit.
Justice Gilbert’s dissent in Ly hints at yet another problem with
pretrial discovery and the public benefit limit, arguing that the
court should have remanded the case to the trial court for a
262
determination of facts relevant to the finding of a public benefit.
The court’s decision to reverse and enter judgment for Ms.
Nystrom presaged the sweeping application of the public benefit
limit as a matter of law in later lower court decisions. In Collins, the
court held again that the determination of a public benefit should
263
Treating the public benefit as a legal
be reviewed de novo.
question exacerbates these discovery concerns. Allowing lower
courts to find no public benefit even when the facts are disputed
obviously favors dismissal of such cases because of the asymmetry of
information between individual consumers who may only know of
their own transaction and defendants who obviously are aware of
the company’s pattern of conduct.
D. Uncertain Reach of the Public Benefit Limit Across Consumer Laws
Finally, Ly raises concerns regarding its reach beyond the CFA
to an entire range of other consumer protection laws and
commercial regulations whose express private enforcement
authority is predicated, in whole or in part, on the private attorney

336 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. 1983).
262. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 315 (Minn. 2000) (Gilbert, J., dissenting
in part).
263. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2003)
(citing Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bldg., 369 N.W.2d 527,
529 (Minn. 1985)). See also Heaven & Earth, Inc. v. Wyman Props. Ltd. P’ship, No.
Civ. 03-3327, 2003 WL 22680935, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). But see Laysar,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-4584, 2005 WL 2063929, at *3
(D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005).
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264

general statute. The Ly court reached its result with no mention
of this broader use of the private attorney general statute in
Minnesota law.
Minnesota courts applying laws other than the CFA which are
also enforced under the private attorney general statute have
265
applied the public benefit limit to determine prerequisite to suit.
Laws other than statutory fraud laws, however, rest uneasily under a
public benefit limit. Topical consumer laws, in particular, provide
specific rights gauged to protect individuals from specific practices
in certain types of marketplace transactions that the legislature has
deemed problematic for consumers. Applying the public benefit
limit would mean that the legislature meant to exclude violations of
such laws in one-on-one transactions while providing specific rights
for the individuals engaged in this type of transaction.
For instance, sellers of membership travel clubs that cost $500
or more must provide detailed oral and written disclosures prior to
purchase by the consumer, including the length of time the travel
club has been operating and the number or percentage of
consumers purchasing the service who have complained or
cancelled their contracts pursuant to the right to cancel under the
264. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314. This contrasts with other states in which the
judiciary has imposed, through case law, limits on the right of private plaintiffs to
bring statutory fraud claims. These states have looked only to the state UDAP
statute. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 171. See also supra Part V.B.2.
265. Yarian v. Rainbow Foods Group, No. 01-1144, 2003 WL 24027721, at *7–8
(D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2003) (regarding conduct of state employees under Minnesota
Statutes section 43A.38); Burtch v. Oakland Park, Inc., Nos. A05-1585, A05-1589,
A05-1587, A05-1588, 2006 WL 1806196 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 2006) (regulating
conduct of manufactured home park lot rentals); Cavanaugh v. Hometown Am.,
L.L.C., No. A05-595, 2006 WL 696259, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006)
(claiming action for regulation of conduct by manufacturing home parks under
Minnesota Statutes chapter 327C), rev. denied (Minn. May 24, 2006); All Parks
Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund, No.
A05-912, 2006 WL 618932, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006) (same), rev.
granted (Minn. May 24, 2006); Schaff v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., No. A04-1246, 2005
WL 1734031, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 26, 2005) (same), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 2005); Toth v. Arason, No. A04-769, 2005 WL 1216301, at *7 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 17, 2005) (involving Truth in Repairs Act, Minnesota Statutes sections
325F.56–.66), rev. granted (Minn. July 19, 2005); Timeline, L.L.C. v. Williams
Holdings # 3, L.L.C., 698 N.W.2d 181, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (applying
mortgage originator statute, Minnesota Statutes section 58.13 (2002)), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 24, 2005); Jensen v. Duluth Area YMCA, 688 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004) (involving Non-profit Corporation Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter
317A). See also Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (analyzing
Minnesota Statutes section 58.13 claims as well as statutory fraud claims under the
private attorney general statute).
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266

law. Under section 325G.51, violations of these requirements are
267
“subject to the penalties and remedies provided in section 8.31.”
The use of the public benefit limit to exclude a lawsuit under the
private attorney general statute by an individual consumer who did
not receive the proper oral disclosures in a “one-on-one” purchase
of a high cost travel club would be hard to reconcile with the
granting of such consumer-specific rights under section 325G.505.
It is difficult to discern a rationale for holding that the legislature
created such transaction-specific rights, but meant to provide no
private right of action for an individual subjected to a violation of
the law in just such a transaction. Conversely, nothing in the
express language of the enforcement provision for this law, section
325G.51, obviously distinguishes the incorporation of the private
attorney general statute in this context from its incorporation as
the remedial provision for the CFA.
The public benefit limit would also likely have led to a
different result in a prior decision of the Minnesota Supreme
268
Court, Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South.
The plaintiffs in
Jacobs were a couple who purchased a mobile home in a one-on-one
269
They prevailed at trial, including their claim for
transaction.
270
breach of express warranty.
The court held that because
breaches of an express warranty constitute per se violations of the
271
consumer protection act, attorney’s fees were recoverable.
However, the holding that the plaintiffs engaged in a one-on-one
transaction had a right to recover attorney’s fees under the private
attorney general statute would not be sustainable under the public
benefit limit.
Requiring the plaintiff to prove “public benefit” in a private
right of action under these topical laws would invite a restriction of
consumer protection enforcement across a range of statutes—a
restriction for which there is no support in the language or
purpose of those statutes. In short, Ly is an unwarranted invitation
for courts to rewrite Minnesota law in favor of specific businesses
whose conduct as to individual consumers the legislature sought to
266. MINN. STAT. § 325G.505 (2004).
267. Id. § 325G.51.
268. 310 N.W.2d 71, 79–80 (Minn. 1981).
269. Id. at 73.
270. Id. at 79.
271. Id. After Jacobs was decided, the relevant laws were re-codified to state
that violation of an express warranty constitutes a CFA violation. See MINN. STAT. §
325G.20 (2004).
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restrain in passing topical consumer protection laws.
VII. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT LIMIT UNDERCUTS PROGRESSIVE
CONSUMER ENFORCEMENT
The public benefit limit has reduced the progressiveness of
Minnesota consumer protection law. The doctrine was created by
the judiciary and should be either overturned or substantially
narrowed, or it should be eliminated by legislative action, as has
occurred in Illinois and Connecticut.
A. The Public Benefit Limit Has Reduced Access to the Courts in Cases of
Marketplace Deception and Unequal Bargaining Power
If progressive private enforcement of Minnesota statutory
fraud laws means that consumers can use these laws to obtain relief
from transactions entered in circumstances of unequal marketplace
bargaining power, then the public benefit limit has impaired the
progressiveness of Minnesota consumer protection laws. It has
done so because it excludes consumer protection claims that
involve substantial bargaining power disparities, in many instances
greater disparities than are present in claims allowed under the
rule.
The public benefit limit also reduces progressive
enforcement by creating uncertainty and realigning incentives for
attorneys considering representing clients with claims of
marketplace deception and fraud.
1. The Public Benefit Limit Precludes Suits by Consumers with
Unequal Bargaining Power
One need look no further than the outcome of cases under
the public benefit limit to determine that it has served to unequally
distribute access to the courts so that more powerful parties will
sometimes be able to assert consumer protection claims while those
at a marketplace disadvantage have no right to bring a claim.
Individual consumers faced with significant bargaining power
disparities have been denied access to the courts while marketplace
competitors have had more success crossing the public benefit
threshold. In the example cases noted above, a consumer buying a
boat from a dealer, a homeowner seeking a mortgage refinance
from a major financial institution and a family farmer deceived
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about the qualities of equipment obtained from a large equipment
272
Business
manufacturer were unable to bring CFA claims.
plaintiffs, on the other hand, have fared somewhat better in
273
asserting statutory fraud claims.
Hoang Minh Ly’s case was a stark example of an individual in
an unequal bargaining position. He had little formal education,
had little command of the English language, and appeared to have
been manipulated by a more sophisticated seller who repeatedly
274
told him to trust her and not to consult a lawyer.
The fraud
perpetrated against him was found by the court to involve
275
“reprehensible conduct.” Yet, he had no private right to enforce
276
consumer protection laws.
Contrast Laysar, Inc. v. State Farm
277
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., in which an auto glass repair
company and allied plaintiffs sought to force an insurer to pay its
claims in full and argued that the insurer violated the CFA by
selling auto policies that falsely implied full glass coverage while
278
“short paying virtually every glass shop invoice.” While the suit by
the individual plaintiff in this case may be of benefit to consumers
generally, the case primarily involves a dispute between businesses.
There is little doubt that Mr. Ly suffered from a larger bargaining
disparity than did Laysar, Inc. Similarly, while the CFA suit by
279
Thomas & Betts Corporation may have been of some benefit to
users of waste oil furnaces, allowing it to pursue a claim against a
former distributor clearly does less to remedy unequal bargaining
280
power than allowing the Dicksons to recover on a CFA claim for a
boat previously sold to a buyer in another state, returned due to
poor quality, and resold as a demonstrator to the plaintiffs.
The bias in the public benefit limit in favor of class actions
over individual suits also does not necessarily serve the purpose of
remedying unequal bargaining power. There is no reason to doubt
the allowance of CFA suits by investors in junior mortgage notes or

272. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
273. See supra notes 159–161, 171, and accompanying text.
274. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 305–06 (Minn. 2000).
275. Id. at 314.
276. Id.
277. No. Civ. 04-4584, 2005 WL 2063929 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2005).
278. Id. at *1.
279. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leger, No. A04-260, 2004 WL 2711391 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2005).
280. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
25, 2005).
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purchasers of ink cartridges with computer printers.
Such class
action suits, however, do not necessarily do more to advance the
purpose of providing consumers a remedy for unequal bargaining
282
power than the case brought by Virginia Scally, who went to Wells
Fargo Mortgage “to refinance her home and consolidate her credit283
card debt with an existing home-equity loan.”
These results are likely to persist because of the bias in the
construction of the “public benefit” limit in favor of certain types of
litigants. Individual consumers typically are sold goods through
oral communication or a pattern of conduct with salespeople when
purchasing a car, boat, appliance, loan, or other merchandise.
These transactions have an inherent tendency to be “one-on-one”
in nature. Business litigants, however, will often bring suit to
change the general practices or public solicitations of their
284
competitors or others. Despite Collins, false advertising suits
285
usually are brought by business competitors, not consumers. But
it is false advertising suits, or similar claims, that will have the
easiest time meeting the public benefit limit, because these actions
involve broad dissemination of the offending representations to the
public. This outcome favors suit by competitive equals while
reducing access to suit by those on the lesser end of a disparity in
bargaining power.
This is not a zero sum situation, in any case. CFA claims by
individuals could be allowed to proceed while other types of
plaintiffs also have access to the courts. But it is especially
regressive to allow larger, better-funded litigants the right to pursue
CFA claims while denying that right to individuals with typically
smaller claims.
It is difficult to reconcile these outcomes with the court’s
repeated statements that statutory fraud laws are meant to “address
the unequal bargaining power that is often found in consumer
286
transactions.”
The Ly decision and later cases make no mention

281. Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2001); Johnson v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CX-01-1641, 2002 WL 1050426 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22,
2002).
282. Scally v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., No. C4-02-2181, 2003 WL 22039526
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003).
283. Id. at *1.
284. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2003).
285. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 171.
286. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2000). See cases cited supra
note 45.
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of how the purpose of remedying unequal bargaining power can be
reconciled with holding that individual consumers subject to
deception by more sophisticated parties have no right to enforce
287
these laws.
The strict dichotomy in Ly between an expansively
read CFA and a constricted private attorney general statute is also
hard to reconcile with the court’s oft-articulated position,
reiterated in the Ly decision, that statutory fraud laws are meant to
288
encourage aggressive prosecutions. If these laws have nothing to
say about who has a remedy for a violation, then they cannot
meaningfully encourage aggressive prosecutions. The public
benefit limit, in fact, has had the exact opposite effect—to
eliminate suits by entire categories of plaintiffs with otherwise valid
statutory fraud claims.
2. The Public Benefit Limit Reduces Progressiveness by Increasing
Uncertainty and Changing Incentives for Plaintiff’s Counsel
The public benefit limit can chill suits for reasons beyond the
litany of poor outcomes for plaintiffs. Eliminating statutory fraud
claims for individuals does not mean that these plaintiffs necessarily
lack a legal basis for relief, even if common law fraud is the only
289
claim. It does mean that these plaintiffs are unlikely to obtain an
award of attorney’s fees, which for all practical purposes means

287. Brasel concluded that the majority rejected any consideration of unequal
bargaining power in determining what is a public benefit:
Both the Ly majority and the Watpro dissent can be read to suggest that
an analysis of the sophistication of the parties is not relevant to a public
benefit. Nothing about the bargaining power of the parties to a private
lawsuit speaks to the issue of whether the consumers of Minnesota are
benefited by a particular plaintiff’s action. Thus, an unsophisticated
consumer with little bargaining power should not be allowed to make use
of the Private AG Statute unless the transaction he or she complains of
reaches a wider audience.
Brasel, supra note 237, at 340.
288. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 308.
289. There are some cases where the plaintiff may not have another claim
because statutory fraud laws broaden the cause of action for fraud and deception
by eliminating elements of common law fraud. For example, in Wiegand v. Walser
Automotive Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2004), the plaintiff alleged an oral
misrepresentation contradicted by a later, written representation in the contract.
The plaintiff had no common law fraud claim because the contract clause
contradicting the oral representation provided a defense as a matter of law on the
justifiable reliance element of common law fraud. Id. at 810. Under the CFA,
common law justifiable reliance is not an element of the claim and thus the lower
courts dismissal of the case was reversed. Id. at 812–13.
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there is no right to relief for many or most of these plaintiffs.
Denying the right to recover attorney’s fees actively, perhaps fatally,
discourages most private prosecutions of fraud violations. As the
court’s majority observed in Church of Nativity, failure to grant
attorney’s fees in that case would mean that “Nativity will spend
290
virtually all of its damage award paying its attorneys.”
The
encouragement of suit by private counsel also was the point
291
emphasized in the court of appeals decisions cited in Ly.
The public benefit limit on suit introduces substantial
uncertainty into the calculus for attorneys considering
representation of plaintiffs with possible statutory fraud claims. As
the court of appeals stated in Dickson, the notion of “public benefit”
292
can mean “about what you want it to be.” The uncertainty of the
parameters of the doctrine makes it difficult for a potential
plaintiff’s counsel to estimate the likelihood of prevailing before
the court, which makes it less likely for such counsel to accept
representation of consumers with fraud claims. In Collins, for
instance, the trial court “denied any attorney fees on the ground
that [plaintiffs’] claims” lacked public benefit, despite the fact that
there were eighteen plaintiffs making similar complaints about
representations that were, in part, in broadcast advertising and
293
written materials.
The alternate rationale used by courts for the exclusion of
statutory fraud claims under the public benefit limit also is
troubling from the perspective of certainty of outcomes in private
enforcement of these laws. Several courts have dismissed statutory
fraud claims because the defendant ceased the conduct or the
plaintiff’s requested relief was deemed insufficiently publicly
294
minded to allow a statutory fraud claim to proceed.
This means
that a potential plaintiff’s attorney faces the additional uncertainty
that later actions of the defendant, or of a public agency, can
deprive the plaintiff of a possible statutory fraud claim.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys can increase the likelihood of prevailing
under the public benefit limit by putting additional resources into

290. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 8
(Minn. 1992).
291. See supra Part V.B.1.
292. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2005).
293. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Minn. 2003).
294. See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.
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pre-complaint investigations or by filing an action and pursuing
discovery for the purpose of better establishing that the
295
defendant’s conduct reached other consumers.
Plaintiff
attorneys thus have an incentive to either refuse to represent
individuals with consumer protection problems, or to attempt to
turn such cases into a class action or a case with multiple, joined
plaintiffs. Pursuing this sort of mass action increases the costs and
risks of such litigation. And larger cases do not necessarily mean
more remedies for unequal bargaining power in the marketplace,
especially if it precludes the willingness of attorneys to help
individuals with smaller claims.
Uncertainties and other disincentives for attorneys to take
cases for individuals are less of a concern for business plaintiffs
pursuing violations of statutory fraud laws. Companies presumably
have business motivations for engaging in litigation, and resources
for conducting the litigation, that make attorney’s fees under
statutory fraud laws a bonus rather than an essential factor in
deciding to pursue a case. The businesses pursuing Lanham Act
claims against competitor advertising, for example, likely would
bring the case in the absence of a valid state statutory fraud claim.
B. The Public Benefit Limit Should Be Abandoned or Narrowly Focused
Even if a more progressive interpretation of the law is not
considered a desirable goal consistent with the enunciated purpose
of statutory fraud laws, the Minnesota Supreme Court should
abandon the public benefit limit on the private attorney general
statute. This doctrine ignores the unambiguous language of the
statute; it is uneasily and improperly grounded in the attorney
general’s discretionary authority; it violates the oft-stated purposes
of statutory fraud laws; and it creates uncertainty in enforcing a
range of topical consumer protection laws.
Perhaps most
importantly, the public benefit limit is not a discerning or effective
means to address the problem underlying its creation. This last
point is the focus of the remainder of this Article.
1. The Poor Fit Between the Court’s Concerns and the Public Benefit
Limit
The majority in Ly seemed animated by a concern with putting

295.

See supra Part VI.C.
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limits on the broadly worded and construed CFA so that it would
not become an additional, routine claim in common disputes
296
between litigants in order to obtain attorney’s fees.
The court
cited Justice Simonett’s dissent in Church of Nativity expressing the
fear that “enterprising plaintiffs” might seek attorney’s fees in cases
beyond those intended under the private attorney general
297
statute.
The court also worried that “artful counsel could dress
298
up his dog bite case” to obtain fees under the statute.
The public benefit limit appears aimed at striking a balance
between maintaining a broad reading of statutory fraud laws and
this articulated concern with use of these laws to obtain attorney’s
fees in routine cases. Although it is sometimes lost in the roll-back
of the right to bring a private enforcement action, the court in Ly
unanimously found that the transaction between a restaurant buyer
299
and seller was within the scope of the CFA.
Two subsequent
decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court have emphasized that
300
In
statutory fraud laws are broader than common law fraud.
Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., the court answered
certified questions from the federal district court and held that
non-purchasers can bring a CFA claim and that proof of individual
301
common law reliance is not required to bring a CFA claim.
In
Wiegand v. Walser Automotive Groups, Inc., the court reversed the
lower courts, reiterating that the CFA eliminated the common law
requirement of reliance and holding that deceptive oral statements
302
contradicted by written statements are actionable under the CFA.
These cases support broadly applying the CFA, and encourage
relaxed standards for proof of injury under the private attorney
296. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000). But see Sovern, supra
note 9, at 446–48 (suggesting that merchants should bear the burden of proving a
proposed defense and if successful, should bear no liability for attorney’s fees).
297. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311 (citing Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v.
WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., dissenting in part)).
298. Id. at 312 (citing Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984)).
299. Id. at 310.
300. See Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Minn.
2004); Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 2001).
At least one commentator also has suggested that Minnesota has broad, proconsumer statutory fraud laws. See Marshall H. Tanick, Fool’s Paradise: Expansion of
the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Laws, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 37 (May/June, 2001)
(arguing that the holding in Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc. in
particular made Minnesota consumer protection statutes “more user friendly”).
301. 621 N.W.2d at 12.
302. 683 N.W.2d at 812.
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general statute, but they leave in place the stringent restriction
imposed by the adoption of the public benefit limit in Ly. On
remand in Wiegand, the court of appeals recently affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of the case for failure to meet the public benefit
303
limit.
The net result is that Minnesota, at least as articulated by
the Minnesota Supreme Court, has broad statutory fraud laws for
mass actions (public enforcement, class actions, or joined cases
involving multiple plaintiffs), but a strong presumption against
304
individual or smaller claims under those laws.
303. Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., No. A05-1911, 2006 WL 1529511
(Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006).
304. The sixteen cases allowed to proceed or which affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff without reference to the public benefit limit are cited supra notes 170–
172. The forty-nine dismissals of statutory fraud claims without reference by the
court to the public benefit limit for the same period, broken down by type of
plaintiff, are as follows: Class or putative class plaintiffs: Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002); Twite v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 052210, 2006 WL 839504 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2006); Thinesen v. JBC Legal Group,
P.C., No. 05-518, 2005 WL 2346991 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2005); Gardner v. First Am.
Title Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Minn. 2003); Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo &
Co., 666 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 2003); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Majors, No. A041468, 2005 WL 1021551 (Minn. Ct. App. May 3, 2005); Porch v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); Carey v. Select Comfort
Corp., No. 27CV 04-015451, 2006 WL 871619 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2006); Dahl
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. MP 03-5582, 2005 WL 1172019 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
May 11, 2005); Mitchell v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. CT 02-17299, 2004 WL
2137815 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004); Business or organizational plaintiffs:
Popp Telecom, Inc. v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 361 F.3d 482 (8th Cir. 2004); Rainbow
Play Sys., Inc. v. GroundScape Tech., L.L.C., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Minn.
2005); Masterson Personnel, Inc. v. McClatchy Co., No. Civ. 05-1274, 2005 WL
3132349 (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2005); Lutheran Ass'n of Missionaries & Pilots, Inc. v.
Lutheran Ass'n of Missionaries & Pilots, Inc., No. Civ. 03-6173, 2004 WL 1212083
(D. Minn. May 20, 2004); Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Global Pharms., 298 F. Supp. 2d
880 (D. Minn. 2004); SICK, Inc. v. Motion Control Corp., No. Civ. 01-1496, 2003
WL 21448864 (D. Minn. June 19, 2003); Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Minn. 2003); Taylor Inv. Corp. v. Weil, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1046
(D. Minn. 2001); First Nat’l Bank of North v. Miller Schroeder Fin., Inc., 709
N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2006); NJR of
Woodbury, Inc. v. Woida, No. A05-268, 2005 WL 3372625 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13,
2005); Loop Corp. v. McIlroy, No. A04-362, 2004 WL 2221619 (Minn. Ct. App.
Oct. 5, 2004); Lyon Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Protech Plumbing & Heating, Inc., No. A03810, 2004 WL 376966 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004); Arrowhead Bluffs, Inc. v.
Blackburn, Nos. C8-03-301, A03-755, 2003 WL 22778336 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25,
2003); and Individual plaintiffs: Bykov v. Radisson Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.051280, 2006 WL 752942 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2006); Hecksel v. Cent. Livestock Ass'n,
Inc., No. Civ. 03-2604, 2005 WL 2406032 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2005); Foster v. St.
Jude Med., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 599 (D. Minn. 2005); Hopkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C.,
No. 03-5433, 2004 WL 1854191 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2004); Reno v. Supportkids,
Inc., No. Civ.01-2331, 2004 WL 828150 (D. Minn. Apr. 13, 2004); Golden v. Town
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The public benefit limit is both ineffective and unfair as a
means of balancing broad application of statutory fraud laws and
the perceived potential for misuse of those laws to shift attorney’s
fees in routine cases. Eliminating individual claims is not a
substitute for finding a balance. Claims arising from individual
“one-on-one” transactions are not universally attempts to dress up
dog bite cases; and the class action, joinder, and business-plaintiff
suits allowed since Ly are not always a close fit with the “intended
scope” of the private attorney general statute. The Ly court never
explained how restricting suits arising from one-on-one
transactions resolved the perceived problem of overuse of statutory
fraud laws to shift attorney’s fees in routine cases. The public

& Country Credit, No. Civ.02-3627, 2004 WL 229078 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2004);
Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning L.L.C., No. Civ.02-791, 2003 WL 21909570 (D.
Minn. July 28, 2003), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004);
Keckhafer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ.01-1017, 2002 WL 31185866 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2002); Michel v. Vogelpohl, No. A05-1263, 2006 WL 1073191 (Minn.
Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2006); Liabo v. Wayzata Nissan, L.L.C., 707 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006); Pugh v. Westreich, No. A04-657,
2005 WL 14922 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2005);
Reinke v. Harold Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., No. A03-1148, 2004 WL 1152700 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 20, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004); Redden v. Minneapolis
Cmty. & Technical Coll., No. A03-1202, 2004 WL 835768 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 20,
2004); Higgins v. Harold Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., No. A04-596, 2004 WL 2660923
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004); Shafer v. GSF Mortgage Corp., No. C1-02-1165,
2003 WL 21005793 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2003); Beutz v. Marshall, No. C5-021489, 2003 WL 1816024 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003); Tisdell v. ValAdCo, Nos.
C6-01-2057, C0-01-2054, C6-01-2060, C2-01-2005, 2002 WL 31368336 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 16, 2002); Erickson v. Horing, No. C4-02-138, 2002 WL 31163611 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2002) (three individual joined plaintiffs); Swanson v. Minn. FAIR
Plan, No. CX-01-1994, 2002 WL 859859 (Minn. Ct. App. May 7, 2002); Sather v.
State Farm Fire Cas. Ins. Co., No. C3-01-1268, 2002 WL 378111 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 12, 2002); Nagle v. N. Cent. Life Ins. Co., No. C4-01-663, 2002 WL 15689
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2002); Lofquist v. Whitaker Buick-Jeep-Eagle, Inc., No. C501-767, 2001 WL 1530907 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001); Swarthout v. Mut. Serv.
Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Rothenberg v. Milne, No. C6-00444, 2000 WL 1780326 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000); Gagne v. Septon, No. CT 02001508, 2004 WL 3090375 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2004); Sachs v. Minneapolis
Cmty. & Technical Coll., No. CT 02-7231, 2003 WL 23893283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June
4, 2003). Thus, of cases decided after Ly but prior to July 31, 2006 that did not
expressly apply the public benefit limit, forty-nine of sixty-five (seventy-five
percent) were dismissed. This result provides reasons to doubt the validity of the
Ly majority’s concern with overuse of statutory fraud laws. The most common
reasons for dismissal were: the plaintiffs’ claim was not within the scope of the
CFA; the plaintiffs failed to show a disputed material fact as to deception; or the
plaintiffs failed to establish a causal nexus between the alleged deceptive conduct
and the alleged injury.
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benefit limit works to meet its goal only in the sense that
eliminating all individual claims eliminates all perceived problems
from a large share of cases raising statutory fraud claims.
For instance, when class plaintiffs in a CFA suit alleged
primarily breach of contract, the state district court in Edwards v.
Long Beach rejected defendant Washington Mutual’s motion to
305
dismiss.
Each member of the class had been charged $60 for a
306
payoff quote and then provided an inaccurate payoff statement.
In allowing the suit to proceed, the court noted the number of
individuals affected by the practice and “oppressive nature of the
307
practices.” In Ali v. Francois, the state district court allowed seven
308
joined plaintiffs to bring CFA claims.
The plaintiffs had entered
contracts with the defendant corporation under which the
plaintiffs made upfront payments to the defendant in exchange for
work as “janitorial subcontractors” on jobs to be arranged by the
309
defendant. The plaintiffs sued for breach of these contracts and
310
The court found a
violations of the CFA, among other claims.
public benefit to the suit because of the potential for continued
misconduct by the defendant, and entered judgment against the
311
defendants.
Both of these cases involve more than one-on-one transactions
and are within the type of CFA claim permissible under the public
benefit limit. In both of these cases, however, the underlying
conduct of the defendant was held to be a breach of contract, and
the CFA claim flowed from the implied representations in the
312
contract.
This contrasts with the false and deceptive non313
contractual oral representations made to Mr. Ly, and with the
false and misleading claims of product quality or origin made to
314
315
the Dicksons or the Zutz family —all of which seem to fall more
305. Edwards v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. CT 02-16446, 2004 WL
2137824, *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 22, 2004).
306. Id. at *2.
307. Id. at *4.
308. Ali v. Francois, No. CT 02-002459, 2003 WL 23515768, at *5 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Nov. 5, 2003).
309. Id. at *1.
310. Id.
311. Id. at *4.
312. Edwards, 2004 WL 2137824, at *4; Ali, 2003 WL 23515768, at *3.
313. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Minn. 2000).
314. Dickson v. Lundquist, No. A04-990, 2005 WL 147719, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2005).
315. Zutz v. Case Corp., No. Civ. 02-1776, 2003 WL 22848943, at *1 (D. Minn.
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easily into the category of deception and fraud that is the focus of
the CFA. Yet all these latter cases were dismissed as lacking a
public benefit.
2.

A Refocused Public Benefit Test

If neither the court nor the legislature decides to eliminate the
public benefit limit on private statutory fraud actions, the doctrine
should at least be narrowed and refocused on the issue it was
meant to resolve. A revised public benefit doctrine could directly
address the court’s concern with the use of the fee-shifting
provision in the private attorney general statute by limiting the
amount of attorney’s fee awards in cases involving conduct that is
not related to the underlying purposes of the consumer protection
laws.
Minnesota courts consider several factors, such as time
expended and experience of counsel, in determining the proper
316
amount to award in attorney’s fees.
A revised public benefit
doctrine could add additional factors to that list in cases of
attorney’s fee awards under the private attorney general statute.
Specifically, such factors might include the following: (1) the
centrality of the consumer protection claim to the conduct at issue
in the case; (2) whether the attorney’s fee award will encourage
other counsel to assume representation in similar consumer
protection cases; (3) whether the damage award or other relief
obtained by the plaintiff(s) remedies the conduct, or provides a
disincentive to the defendant or similarly situated entities to
engage in such conduct; and (4) whether the plaintiff’s suit is
otherwise of benefit to the public.
There are at least three important advantages to a narrowed
and refocused public benefit test. First, it would be directed at the
problem articulated by the court, which is awarding of attorney’s
fees to litigants whose cases will promote the purposes of
Minnesota consumer protection laws. The proposed test for
attorney’s fees allows courts discretion to limit substantial feeshifting in cases of peripheral consumer protection concern. Most
“dog bite” cases will not survive judgment as a matter of law on the
merits of the statutory fraud claim or the need to establish a causal
nexus between consumer injury and the alleged fraud. In the cases
Nov. 21, 2003).
316. State v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1971).
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that are held to properly allege a statutory fraud claim, but that
appear remote from the purpose of those laws, courts can reduce
attorney’s fees accordingly.
Second, limiting the public benefit test to the amount of
attorney’s fees awarded provides a more appropriate sliding scale
for the courts to apply when compared to forcing dismissal of
claims. The current public benefit doctrine is a limit on private
suits. It acts like a meat cleaver, either separating the statutory
fraud claims or allowing them to proceed. If the plaintiff alleges
only a one-on-one transaction, his or her statutory fraud claim
likely will be dismissed. A public benefit test tied to the amount of
attorney’s fees allows courts flexibility in matching the degree of
public benefit to the amount of fee-shifting.
The decision to award attorney’s fees occurs only after
judgment on the underlying statutory fraud claim. Accordingly,
the court will be aware of all the relevant facts and circumstances at
the time it makes a determination of the public benefit in awarding
fees. Under the current public benefit limit, the court typically
makes this determination on motion at the outset of the litigation,
sometimes before any discovery has occurred. Pushing back the
time of applying the test also promotes judicial efficiency, as cases
will often be settled or dismissed on other grounds before the court
is forced to make a ruling on the amount of attorney’s fees.
Third and finally, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the
language of the private attorney general statute arguably provides
some support for this approach. The majority in Ly made no
attempt to identify any ambiguity in the language of the private
attorney general statute. As the dissenters noted, there is no
ambiguity in the phrase granting a private right of action to “any
317
person injured by a violation” of the statutory fraud laws.
Even
accepting the court’s logical leap in limiting private suits to the
attorney general’s authority, this is an uneasy and ill-fitting legal
basis for the doctrine, for the reasons previously noted.
Minnesota Statutes section 8.31 allows for the recovery of
318
“reasonable attorney’s fees.” The term “reasonable” is sufficiently
ambiguous to support a construction that allows for consideration
of the purpose of the private attorney general statute and the

317.
part).
318.

Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 315 (Minn. 2000) (Page, J., dissenting in
MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a (2004).
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incorporated statutory fraud laws. It also is consistent with the
older Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions that held “public
interest” should be a consideration in determining the amount of
319
the attorney’s fee award.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Minnesota courts have actively stretched beyond the express
statutory language to create legal barriers effectively shutting the
courthouse door to individual consumers with otherwise valid
statutory fraud claims alleging marketplace deception. The public
benefit limit enunciated in Ly v. Nystrom tacitly overturned longstanding case law with a vague and improperly grounded doctrine.
It has been used by Minnesota courts to routinely dismiss claims by
individuals under Minnesota statutory fraud laws, in effect limiting
statutory fraud suits mostly to better-funded and more powerful
litigants. As a result, Minnesota cannot be said to have progressive
law for private enforcement of consumer protection laws. The
court or the legislature should eliminate the public benefit limit, or
at least narrow and refocus the doctrine on the perceived policy
concern underlying its creation.

319. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 312 (citing Wexler v. Bros. Entm’t Group, Inc., 457
N.W.2d 218, 222–23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556,
558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), and Untiedt v. Grand Labs., Inc., Nos. C4-94-772, C094-851, 1994 WL 714308, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
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